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Across the country, heavily armed Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams are forcing their way into 
people’s homes in the middle of the night, often deploying 
explosive devices such as flashbang grenades to temporarily 
blind and deafen residents, simply to serve a search warrant 
on the suspicion that someone may be in possession of 
a small amount of drugs. Neighborhoods are not war 
zones, and our police officers should not be treating us 
like wartime enemies. However, the ACLU encountered 
this type of story over and over when studying the 
militarization of state and local law enforcement agencies.
This investigation gave us data to corroborate a trend we 
have been noticing nationwide: American policing has 
become unnecessarily and dangerously militarized, in 
large part through federal programs that have armed state 
and local law enforcement agencies with the weapons 
and tactics of war, with almost no public discussion or 
oversight.1 Using these federal funds, state and local law 
enforcement agencies have amassed military arsenals 
purportedly to wage the failed War on Drugs, the 
battlegrounds of which have disproportionately been in 
communities of color. But these arsenals are by no means 
free of cost for communities. Instead, the use of hyper-
aggressive tools and tactics results in tragedy for civilians 
and police officers, escalates the risk of needless violence, 
destroys property, and undermines individual liberties.
This report provides a snapshot of the realities of 
paramilitary policing, building on a body of existing work 
demonstrating that police militarization is a pervasive 
problem. Analyzing both existing secondary source 
materials and primary source data uncovered through the 
ACLU’s public records investigation, this report examines 
the use of SWAT teams by state and local law enforcement 
agencies and other aspects of militaristic policing.2 As 
explained in the Methodology section, our statistical 
analysis included more than 800 SWAT deployments 
conducted by 20 law enforcement agencies during the years 
2011-2012.3
SWAT was created to deal with emergency situations such 
as hostage, barricade and active shooter scenarios. Over 
time, however, law enforcement agencies have moved away 
from this original purpose and are increasingly using these 
paramilitary squads to search people’s homes for drugs. 
Aggressive enforcement of the War on Drugs has lost 
its public mandate, as 67 percent of Americans think 
the government should focus more on treatment than 
on policing and prosecuting drug users.4 This waning 
public support is warranted, as evidence continues to 
document how the War on Drugs has destroyed millions 
of lives, unfairly impacted communities of color, made 
drugs cheaper and more potent, caused countless deaths 
of innocent people caught up in drug war-related armed 
conflict, and failed to eliminate drug dependence and 
addiction. The routine use of heavily armed SWAT teams 
to search people’s homes for drugs, therefore, means that 
law enforcement agencies across the country are using this 
hyper-aggressive form of domestic policing to fight a war 
that has waning public support and has harmed, much 
more than helped, communities.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
DRUG SEARCHES
UNKNOWN
OTHER
62%
28%
9%
DRUG SEARCHES • 62%
UNKNOWN • 9%
OTHER • 28%
Majority of SWAT Deployments 
for Drug Searches (2011-2012)
Source: Data provided by local law enforcement agencies for ACLU 
investigation.
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SWAT raids are undoubtedly violent events: numerous 
(often 20 or more) officers armed with assault rifles 
and grenades approach a home, break down doors and 
windows (often causing property damage), and scream for 
the people inside to get on the floor (often pointing their 
guns at them). During the course of this investigation, 
the ACLU determined that SWAT deployments often 
and unnecessarily entailed the use of violent tactics and 
equipment, including Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), 
and that the use of these tactics and equipment often 
increased the risk of property damage and bodily harm. 
Unnecessarily aggressive SWAT raids can have disastrous 
consequences, including injury and death. The ACLU also 
uncovered numerous instances in which SWAT teams 
deployed when there were children present (and some in 
which the SWAT team knew in advance that children would 
be present).
To scale back the militarization of police, it is important to 
document how law enforcement agencies have stockpiled 
their arsenals. Law enforcement agencies have become 
equipped to carry out these SWAT missions in part by 
federal programs such as the Department of Defense’s 1033 
Program, the Department of Homeland Security’s grants 
to local law enforcement agencies, and the Department of 
Justice’s Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant 
(JAG) Program, each of which is examined in this report. 
De-escalating militarized policing will also require 
analysis of how the presence of these weapons and tactics 
has impacted policing culture. Our analysis shows that 
the militarization of American policing is evident in the 
training that police officers receive, which encourages them 
to adopt a “warrior” mentality and think of the people 
they are supposed to serve as enemies, as well as in the 
equipment they use, such as battering rams, flashbang 
grenades, and APCs. This shift in culture has been buoyed 
by the U.S. Supreme Court’s weakening of the Fourth 
Amendment (which protects the right to privacy in one’s 
home) through a series of decisions that have given the 
police increased authority to force their way into people’s 
homes, often in drug cases.
Additionally, solving the problem of police militarization 
requires discussion of how SWAT teams should be 
appropriately used and when their deployment is 
counterproductive and dangerous. Even though 
paramilitary policing in the form of SWAT teams was 
created to deal with emergency scenarios such as hostage 
or barricade situations, the use of SWAT to execute search 
warrants in drug investigations has become commonplace 
and made up the overwhelming majority of incidents 
the ACLU reviewed—79 percent of the incidents the 
ACLU studied involved the use of a SWAT team to search 
a person’s home, and more than 60 percent of the cases 
involved searches for drugs. The use of a SWAT team to 
execute a search warrant essentially amounts to the use 
of paramilitary tactics to conduct domestic criminal 
investigations in searches of people’s homes. 
Militarization of policing 
encourages officers to  
adopt a “warrior” mentality 
and think of the people they 
are supposed to serve as 
enemies.
In the ACLU’s study, SWAT teams forced entry into 
a person’s home using a battering ram or other 
breaching device in 65% of drug searches.
Photo: Keep Columbia Free via FIO/Sunshine request.  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ng6mfpZ2kR4
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have guns, use of a SWAT team could almost always be 
justified if the “presence of a firearm” was the sole factor 
determining whether to deploy.5 However, because the use 
of SWAT increases the likelihood that the occupants will 
use weapons to defend themselves, which increases the 
risk of violence, presence of a weapon alone should not 
automatically result in a SWAT deployment.
These problems have been allowed to occur in the absence 
of public oversight. Data collection has been sparse and 
inadequate: among the law enforcement agencies studied, 
the ACLU found that data collecting and reporting in the 
context of SWAT was at best sporadic and at worst virtually 
nonexistent. 
In addition, there is typically no single entity at the local, 
state, or federal level responsible for ensuring that SWAT is 
appropriately restrained and that policing does not become 
excessively militarized. Maryland passed a law in 2010 
requiring local law enforcement agencies to submit regular 
reports on their use of SWAT, but that law will sunset 
this year. Utah passed a similar law this year, which looks 
promising, but much more oversight is needed.
Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., has announced broad 
criminal justice reforms, including guidelines to curtail 
the use of mandatory minimum sentencing laws by federal 
prosecutors in certain drug cases and a $4.75 million 
project funded by the federal government and designed 
to ease mistrust between local police departments and 
minority communities by collecting and studying data on 
searches, arrests, and case outcomes in order to help assess 
the impact of possible bias. These developments have real 
potential to reduce America’s excessive reliance on overly 
aggressive approaches to policing and punishing drug 
crimes, but there is a danger that these federally-funded 
efforts could be undermined by the federal government’s 
role in subsidizing the use of paramilitary weapons and 
tactics in localities, particularly in many communities 
of color. Without rethinking its role in militarizing local 
police departments, the federal government may end up 
sabotaging the very same reforms it is championing.
From our review of both primary and secondary source 
materials, we are able to present two sets of findings: one 
set of general findings based on our review of the existing 
The use of SWAT teams to serve search warrants could 
perhaps be justified if there were reason to believe that 
these situations truly presented a genuine threat to officer 
safety, but that did not appear to be the case from the 
documents that the ACLU examined; of the incidents 
in which officers believed a weapon would be present, 
a weapon (typically a firearm such as a handgun but 
rarely an assault rifle) was actually found at the scene 
in only 35 percent of cases. Even when officers believed 
a weapon was likely to be present, that belief was often 
unsubstantiated. Unfortunately, reasonable standards for 
deploying SWAT teams appear to be virtually nonexistent. 
Further, given that almost half of American households 
An estimated 500 law  
enforcement agencies have 
received Mine Resistant  
Ambush Protected (MRAP)  
vehicles built to withstand  
armor-piercing roadside  
bombs.
WARRANT
SEARCH WARRANT
OTHER
UNKNOWN
79%
WARRANT
SEARCH WARRANT • 79%
OTHER • 17%
UNKNOWN • 4%
Majority of SWAT Deployments for
Search Warrants (2011-2012)
Source: Data provided by local law enforcement agencies for ACLU 
investigation.
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research, which our data supports, and one set of time-
bound specific findings from our statistical analysis of the 
raw data we collected in connection with our investigation.
Our general findings, based on our review of existing 
research and supported by our data, are the following:
1.	 Policing—particularly through the use of paramilitary 
teams—in the United States today has become 
excessively militarized, mainly through federal 
programs that create incentives for state and local 
police to use unnecessarily aggressive weapons and 
tactics designed for the battlefield. For example, the 
ACLU documented a total of 15,054 items of battle 
uniforms or personal protective equipment received 
by 63 responding agencies during the relevant time 
period, and it is estimated that 500 law enforcement 
agencies have received Mine Resistant Ambush 
Protected (MRAP) vehicles built to withstand armor-
piercing roadside bombs through the Department of 
Defense’s 1033 Program.6
2.	 The militarization of policing in the United States has 
occurred with almost no public oversight. Not a single 
law enforcement agency in this investigation provided 
records containing all of the information that the 
ACLU believes is necessary to undertake a thorough 
examination of police militarization. Some agencies 
provided records that were nearly totally lacking in 
important information. Agencies that monitor and 
provide oversight over the militarization of policing 
are virtually nonexistent.
Our more specific findings from the statistical analysis we 
conducted of time-bound raw data received in connection 
with this investigation are the following:
3.	 SWAT teams were often deployed—unnecessarily and 
aggressively—to execute search warrants in low-level 
drug investigations; deployments for hostage or 
barricade scenarios occurred in only a small number 
of incidents. The majority (79 percent) of SWAT 
deployments the ACLU studied were for the purpose 
of executing a search warrant, most commonly in drug 
investigations. Only a small handful of deployments (7 
percent) were for hostage, barricade, or active shooter 
scenarios.
CASUALTY REPORT
LIMA, OHIO 
JANUARY, 2008
SWAT Officers Kill 26- 
Year-Old Mother Holding 
Infant Son 
Tarika Wilson wasn’t the suspect. She died 
when SWAT officers broke 
down her front door and 
opened fire into her home. 
Ms. Wilson was holding her 
14-month-old son when 
she was shot. The baby was 
injured, but survived. The 
SWAT team had been looking for Ms. Wilson’s 
boyfriend on suspicion of drug dealing when 
they raided Ms. Wilson’s rented house on the 
Southside of Lima, the only city with a significant 
African-American population in a region of 
farmland.
4.	 The use of paramilitary weapons and tactics primarily 
impacted people of color; when paramilitary tactics 
were used in drug searches, the primary targets were 
people of color, whereas when paramilitary tactics 
were used in hostage or barricade scenarios, the 
primary targets were white. Overall, 42 percent of 
people impacted by a SWAT deployment to execute 
a search warrant were Black and 12 percent were 
Latino. This means that of the people impacted by 
deployments for warrants, at least 54 percent were 
minorities. Of the deployments in which all the people 
impacted were minorities, 68 percent were in drug 
cases, and 61 percent of all the people impacted by 
SWAT raids in drug cases were minorities. In addition, 
the incidents we studied revealed stark, often extreme, 
racial disparities in the use of SWAT locally, especially 
in cases involving search warrants.
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Reform must be systemic; the problems of overly aggressive 
policing are cultural and cannot be solved by merely 
identifying a few “bad apples” or dismissing the problem as 
a few isolated incidents.
To begin to solve the problem of overly militarized 
policing, reform must happen at all levels of government 
that have contributed to this trend. 
The federal government should take the lead by reining 
in the programs that create incentives for local police 
to engage in excessively militarized tactics, especially 
in drug cases. The federal government holds the purse 
strings, and easing the flow of federal funds and military-
grade equipment into states and localities would have 
a significant impact on the overuse of hyper-aggressive 
tactics and military-grade tools in local communities.  
Additionally, state legislatures and municipalities should 
impose meaningful restraints on the use of SWAT.  
SWAT deployments should be limited to the kinds of 
scenarios for which these aggressive measures were 
originally intended: barricade, hostage, and active shooter 
situations. Rather than allow a SWAT deployment in 
any case that is deemed (for whatever reason the officers 
determine) to be “high risk,” the better practice would 
be for law enforcement agencies to have in place clear 
standards limiting SWAT deployments to scenarios that are 
truly “high risk.” 
Reform must be systemic; the 
problems of overly aggressive 
policing are cultural and 
cannot be solved by merely 
identifying a few “bad apples” 
or dismissing the problem as  
a few isolated incidents.
INCIDENT REPORT
HUNTINGTON, WEST VIRGINIA 
OCTOBER 14, 2011
SWAT Team Throws 
Flashbang into Home  
of Pregnant Woman
Knowing there would likely be a pregnant woman inside, a SWAT team still opted to 
break down the door of a home and throw a 
flashbang grenade inside in order to execute 
a search warrant in a drug case. Once inside 
the home, SWAT officers found one man, 
one pregnant woman, and a four-year-old 
child. While this particular report contained 
no information about the race of the people 
impacted by the deployment, the majority of 
the Huntington SWAT deployments the ACLU 
studied were conducted in connection with drug 
investigations, and the majority of the people 
impacted were Black. 
5.	 SWAT deployments often and unnecessarily entailed 
the use of violent tactics and equipment, including 
armored personnel carriers; use of violent tactics and 
equipment was shown to increase the risk of bodily 
harm and property damage. Of the incidents studied 
in which SWAT was deployed to search for drugs in 
a person’s home, the SWAT teams either forced or 
probably forced entry into a person’s home using a 
battering ram or other breaching device 65 percent 
of the time. For drug investigations, the SWAT teams 
studied were almost twice as likely to force entry into 
a person’s home than not, and they were more than 
twice as likely to use forced entry in drug investigations 
than in other cases. In some instances, the use of 
violent tactics and equipment caused property damage, 
injury, and/or death.
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SWAT teams should never be deployed based solely on 
probable cause to believe drugs are present, even if they 
have a warrant to search a home. In addition, SWAT teams 
should not equate the suspected presence of drugs with a 
threat of violence. SWAT deployment for warrant service 
is appropriate only if the police can demonstrate, before 
deployment, that ordinary law enforcement officers cannot 
safely execute a warrant without facing an imminent threat 
of serious bodily harm. In making these determinations, it 
is important to take into consideration the fact that use of 
a SWAT team can escalate rather than ameliorate potential 
violence; law enforcement should take appropriate 
precautions to avoid the use of SWAT whenever possible. 
In addition, all SWAT deployments, regardless of the 
underlying purpose, should be proportional—not all 
situations call for a SWAT deployment consisting of 20 
heavily armed officers in an APC, and partial deployments 
should be encouraged when appropriate.
Local police departments should develop their own 
internal policies calling for appropriate restraints on the 
use of SWAT and should avoid all training programs that 
encourage a “warrior” mindset.
Finally, the public has a right to know how law enforcement 
agencies are policing its communities and spending its 
tax dollars. The militarization of American policing has 
occurred with almost no oversight, and it is time to shine 
a bright light on the policies, practices, and weaponry that 
have turned too many of our neighborhoods into war 
zones.
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■■ Whether forcible entry was made
■■ Whether a flashbang grenade or other distraction 
device was used
■■ The purpose of the SWAT deployment (e.g., to 
execute a search warrant, in response to a barricade, 
hostage, or active shooter scenario, etc.)
■■ In search warrant cases, whether the warrant was a 
no-knock warrant
■■ Whether the deployment was in connection with a 
drug offense
■■ Whether weapons were believed to be present
■■ Whether weapons were found
■■ Whether drugs and/or other contraband were 
found
■■ Whether the deployment resulted in property 
damage 
For weapons transfers and federal grants, we considered the 
following:
■■ The amount and type of equipment received
■■ The type of grant program being applied for
■■ The amount of funding requested/received
■■ Whether the justification provided for the grant was 
related to drugs or terrorism
Some SWAT incident reports specifically include some 
form of check box or tick box allowing for a simple yes-
or-no answer to one or more of the above questions (e.g., 
the incident report indicated whether a distraction device 
was employed by expressly requiring law enforcement 
personnel to check a box indicating “Yes” or “No”). 
When reports include such boxes, it is straightforward 
to transform the information contained in the incident 
This report is intended to provide a snapshot of the militarization of policing, a little-understood 
phenomenon that has not been adequately studied. 
It includes analysis of both existing secondary source 
materials and primary source data uncovered through the 
ACLU’s public records investigation, which is described 
below.
On March 6, 2013, the ACLU sent public records requests 
to more than 260 law enforcement agencies in 25 states 
(we later added the District of Columbia and a number 
of cities in a 26th state).7 We asked the law enforcement 
agencies to produce all incident reports (or other records) 
documenting each time a SWAT team was deployed 
between 2011 and 20128—with such incident reports 
breaking down SWAT deployments by suspected crime, 
requesting agency, and purpose for the deployment—as 
well as any post-deployment documents relating to the 
use of no-knock warrants in conjunction with the SWAT 
deployment or the use of force during the deployment, 
including documentation relating to any injuries/deaths 
at the scene of the SWAT operation. As of September 30, 
2013, we had received 3,844 records in response to these 
requests.9 
In order to analyze the information contained in these 
records, we first identified the type of document (e.g., 
SWAT incident report, training document, grant request, 
1033 record, etc.). For each document type, we identified 
several individual data points to collect.
For each SWAT deployment, we considered the following:
■■ The number, race, ethnicity, and sex of people 
impacted
■■ The number of children present, if any
■■ The number of mentally ill civilians impacted,  
if any
■■ The number of officer deaths/injuries, if any
METHODOLOGY
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incident reports considered, then the relevant categorical 
variable is coded as “Unknown.” No inferences are drawn 
in this instance. In the discussion that follows, data that was 
captured as “Likely Yes” or “Likely No” is described as being 
“probably” or “probably not” true.
To ensure that certain results are not merely a function 
of a small number of observations, the analysis considers 
only those law enforcement agencies that produced more 
than 15 incident reports in response to the original public 
records requests, with the exception of the Bay County 
Sheriff ’s Office, which was included in the analysis for the 
purpose of greater geographic diversity. It is important 
to note that the data analysis in the report does not seek 
to make statistical estimates about the larger universe 
reports received into a coherent categorical variable 
representing the various responses of law enforcement 
personnel to the above questions. 
The vast majority of the incident reports considered, 
however, did not consistently and systematically document 
information in such an easily transcribable manner, instead 
communicating or expressing answers—if any at all—to 
the above questions in a textual narrative (often located at 
the end of the incident report). It is, of course, relatively 
more difficult to generate a categorical variable from purely 
narrative text, and, in particular, one must decide how 
to deal with narratives that are silent or ambiguous with 
respect to one or more of the questions posed above. 
For these types of incident reports, the following coding 
procedure was employed: If the narrative affirmatively 
answers one of the preceding questions, then the relevant 
categorical variable is coded as “Yes” (e.g., if the narrative 
explicitly indicates that a flashbang grenade was used 
during the SWAT operation, then the “Was a Distraction 
Device Used” variable is coded as “Yes”). Likewise, if the 
narrative explicitly answers one of the above questions in 
the negative, then the relevant variable is coded as “No.” 
Further, if the narrative strongly suggests a positive answer 
to one of the preceding questions (e.g., with respect to the 
question of whether forcible entry was made, the incident 
report refers to extensive damage to the front door), 
then the variable is coded as “Likely Yes.” Importantly, 
if the narrative is silent or ambiguous with respect to 
one of the above questions, then the relevant variable 
is coded as “Likely No,” based on the theory that police 
officers are unlikely to affirmatively state in an incident 
report that a particular action was not undertaken. With 
respect to the use of a distraction device, for instance, 
police officers are unlikely, arguably, to expressly write 
down or indicate in the incident report that a distraction 
device was not used (when a distraction device was, in 
fact, not used at any point during the SWAT operation). 
It is simply too time-consuming or otherwise costly for 
police officers, in creating a post-deployment narrative, 
to mention all of the possible actions not undertaken 
during the SWAT operation; i.e., the narrative will contain 
mainly a description of what was done as opposed to 
what was not done. Finally, if the narrative is simply left 
blank—occurring with surprisingly high frequency in the 
CASUALTY REPORT
FRAMINGHAM, MASSACHUSETTS 
JANUARY, 2011
SWAT Officer Shoots 
Grandfather of Twelve
Eurie Stamp was in his pajamas, watching a 
baseball game, when SWAT 
officers forced a battering 
ram through his front door 
and threw a flashbang 
grenade inside. Stamp, a 
68-year-old grandfather 
of twelve, followed the 
officers’ shouted orders to 
lie facedown on the floor with his arms above 
his head. He died in this position, when one of 
the officers’ guns discharged. Stamp wasn’t 
the suspect; the officers were looking for his 
girlfriend’s son on suspicion of selling drugs. The 
suspect was arrested outside the home minutes 
before the raid. Even though the actual suspect 
didn’t live in Stamp’s home and was already in 
custody, the SWAT team still decided to carry out 
the raid. Framingham has since disbanded its 
SWAT team.
10 American Civil Liberties Union
For the most part, the data analysis consists of one- and 
two-way tabulations of the variables discussed above. 
Notably, the analysis treats missing values like other 
values, denoting missing or unknown values as “U.” 
Rather than drop missing values from the calculations, 
missing values are explicitly recorded in the tabulations 
in order to highlight the substantial degree to which large 
sections of the incident reports received from the local law 
enforcement agencies are incomplete or simply left blank, 
with no explanation or additional reason given for the 
missing information.  
Also, a significant component of the data analysis 
investigates racial disparities in the use and impact of 
SWAT deployments. To consider this issue, it is necessary 
to classify the “race” of a SWAT deployment in terms of the 
race of individuals impacted by SWAT operations (note 
that the challenge posed in doing so is that there may be 
multiple individuals of varying races impacted in a single 
SWAT deployment). This classification is accomplished 
in one of two distinct ways. Under the first approach, we 
create a variable called “Minority.” Minority is defined 
here as referring only to Black or Latino individuals; our 
definition does not include other minority groups (e.g., 
Asian, Arab, and so forth).  Any given SWAT incident is 
then described as “All White,” meaning that all of those 
impacted by a given SWAT deployment were white; “All 
Minority,” meaning that all of the individuals impacted by 
a given SWAT deployment were either Black or Latino; or 
“Mixed,” meaning that the SWAT incident involved a mix 
of minority and non-minority individuals. 
Under the second approach, we count the total number of 
individuals impacted by a given SWAT incident who were 
either white, Black, or Latino. That is, three numbers are 
calculated for each SWAT incident: (1) the total number 
of whites impacted by the SWAT operation, (2) the total 
number of Blacks impacted by the SWAT operation, and 
(3) the total number of Latinos impacted by the SWAT 
operation.  Tabulations are then run, not with respect to 
the total number of individual SWAT incidents as above, 
but, rather, with respect to the total number of individuals 
impacted by SWAT operations. So, for example, when 
calculating the frequency of SWAT deployments by race 
in a given jurisdiction, under this second approach, we 
calculate the percentage of the total number of individuals 
of SWAT deployments nationwide. Rather, the analysis 
is descriptive in nature, providing a general picture 
of SWAT deployments for this small cross section of 
otherwise randomly chosen law enforcement agencies—the 
information contained in the documents received is not 
used to make more general, broader statements about the 
use and impact of SWAT nationwide.
Narrowing the set of local law enforcement agencies that 
we considered as described in the preceding paragraph, 
the total number of SWAT incidents analyzed is 818, and 
these SWAT incidents are distributed over 20 local law 
enforcement agencies located in the following 11 states: 
Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Washington 
and West Virginia. The agencies were diverse in terms of 
type (including municipal police departments, county 
sheriff ’s offices, a police department covering multiple 
unincorporated areas, and a state patrol), size of population 
covered (ranging from 35,000 to 778,000), region (covering 
the Mid-Atlantic, Appalachian, Northeast, South, West, 
and Northwest regions of the United States, with the South 
most heavily represented), and racial composition (with 
Black percentage population ranging from two percent 
to 42 percent). The SWAT incidents considered span the 
following time period: July 20, 2010, to October 6, 2013, 
with the vast majority of incidents occurring in years 2011 
and 2012.
In the ACLU’s study, SWAT teams were more 
than twice as likely to force entry into a person’s 
home when searching for drugs than for other 
deployments.
Photo: Keep Columbia Free via FIO/Sunshine request.  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ng6mfpZ2kR4
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We also examined information pertaining to transfers of 
military equipment to 63 local law enforcement agencies 
located in the following eight states: Arizona, Arkansas, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, 
and Pennsylvania. The report provides totals by agency 
for different types of equipment, including bomb suits, 
night-vision goggles, drones, shock-cuffs, rifles, cell phone 
sniffers, facial recognition technology, forced-entry tools, 
biometric devices, utility trucks, APCs, helicopters, GPS 
devices, and personal protective armor. 
Finally, we considered information pertaining to the type 
and amount of state and federal grant awards to 27 local 
law enforcement agencies located in the following 13 
states: Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Utah. Grants were 
coded to indicate whether the justification for a particular 
grant was drug-related (“Yes” or “No”) or terrorism-related 
(“Yes” or “No”). Agencies in our dataset received funding 
from the following grant programs, among others: Federal 
Department of Homeland Security Grant Programs, the 
Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) 
Program, the Department of Justice Community Oriented 
Policing Services (COPS) Grant Program, State Homeland 
Security Grant Programs, and National Drug Control 
Policy State and Local Initiatives.
impacted by SWAT operations who are either white, 
Black, or Latino. In other words, the total number of 
Blacks impacted by SWAT operations in the jurisdiction is 
compared to the total number of individuals (of all races) 
impacted by SWAT operations.  
Under the first approach, the relevant unit of measurement 
is the total number of SWAT incidents; under the second 
approach, the relevant unit is the total number of 
individuals impacted by SWAT operations.  Note that 
these two measures may generate differing results insofar 
as the average number of individuals impacted per SWAT 
deployment varies by race. Suppose, for instance, that one 
SWAT deployment can be classified as “All White” and 
another as “All Minority.” Even though there is no racial 
disparity with respect to SWAT incidents in this example, 
there may still be a racial disparity with respect to the total 
number of individuals impacted by SWAT operations if the 
total number of individuals impacted in the “All Minority” 
SWAT incident is larger than the corresponding number of 
individuals impacted in the “All White” SWAT incident.
Racial disparities in SWAT impact rates (as opposed 
to the total number of individuals impacted by SWAT 
deployments) are also considered. By examining impact 
rates, it is possible to control for racial disparities in the 
underlying populations impacted by SWAT deployments. 
Rates are expressed in terms of individuals impacted by 
SWAT deployment per 100,000 individuals. In particular, 
to calculate the white, Black, or Latino SWAT impact 
rate in a given jurisdiction, the number of white, Black, 
or Latino individuals impacted by SWAT deployments is 
divided by the total white, Black, or Latino population in 
that jurisdiction; the corresponding ratio is then multiplied 
by 100,000 to obtain the impact rate per 100,000. In 
this report, the measure of racial disparity in a given 
jurisdiction in terms of SWAT deployments is calculated 
as the ratio of either the Black or Latino impact rate to the 
white impact rate. So, for example, a Black/white racial 
disparity measure (or ratio) of three implies that the 
rate at which Blacks are impacted by SWAT operations 
is three times the rate at which whites are impacted by 
SWAT operations. Likewise, a Latino/white racial disparity 
measure of three implies that the rate at which Latinos are 
impacted by SWAT operations is three times the rate at 
which whites are impacted by SWAT operations.
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Imagine that you are at home with your family, sleeping soundly in the early morning hours. You awaken suddenly 
to a loud explosion and the sound of glass shattering. A 
bright light blinds you and there is a terrible ringing in your 
ears. You cannot see anything, but through the ringing you 
hear the harrowing sound of your front door being broken 
down as your children begin to scream in the next room. As 
you come to your senses, you look outside your window and 
see what appears to be a tank in your driveway. Suddenly, 
people—you have no idea how many—break through 
your bedroom door. In the darkness, all you can see is that 
they are wearing black and carrying assault rifles, and their 
faces are masked. You hear people yelling at you and your 
partner to get on the floor and put your hands behind your 
back. Your children are still screaming in the next room and 
your dog is barking loudly. The people lead you, wearing 
whatever you wore to sleep that night, into the living room, 
pointing assault rifles at you the entire time. You are ordered 
to sit, and someone quickly handcuffs you to the chair. 
More people then bring your partner and your children into 
the living room at gunpoint. Your dog is still barking, and 
one of the people shoots it, killing it instantly, in front of 
you and your children. They then proceed to ransack your 
home, breaking down doors and shattering windows. You 
can see that the explosion you heard earlier came from a 
grenade that now lies near your feet, scorch marks covering 
the floor from the blast. They hold you and your family at 
gunpoint for the next several hours, refusing to answer any 
questions about why they are there or what they are looking 
for. Once they have finally left, you find your home in 
shambles. Broken glass litters the floor, and doors are broken 
from where the police kicked holes in them. Your dog lies 
breathless in a pool of its own blood. Tables are overturned, 
papers are strewn about, and electronic equipment has been 
ripped from the walls and left on the floor. Your partner is 
desperately trying to calm your hysterical children. 
Unfortunately, this is not a scene from an action movie, and 
it did not happen during the course of a protracted battle in 
an overseas war. This is the militarization of our state and 
local police, and events like this are happening every day in 
homes throughout America.
INTRODUCTION
Photo: Keep Columbia Free via FIO/Sunshine request.  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ng6mfpZ2kR4
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Massive Military-Grade 
Weapons Caches in Arizona
The police department in Maricopa County, Arizona – led by the infamous Sheriff Joe Arpaio – has a .50 
caliber machine gun that shoots bullets powerful enough 
to blast through the buildings on multiple city blocks. 
That’s not all: the department has stockpiled a combined 
total of 120 assault rifles, five armored vehicles, and ten 
helicopters. This arsenal was acquired mainly through the 
Department of Defense’s 1033 program, which transfers 
military-grade weaponry to state and local police 
departments, free of charge.
Maricopa County is not unique. According to our 
research, law enforcement agencies in Arizona have 
acquired a staggering cache of military weaponry, 
primarily through the 1033 program, including:
■■ 32 bomb suits
■■ 704 units of night vision equipment, e.g., night-
vision goggles
■■ 1034 guns, of which 712 are rifles
■■ 42 forced entry tools, such as battering rams
■■ 830 units of surveillance and reconnaissance 
equipment
■■ 13,409 personal protective equipment (PPE) 
and/or uniforms
■■ 120 utility trucks
■■ 64 armored vehicles
■■ 4 GPS devices
■■ 17 helicopters
■■ 21,211 other types of military equipment
All 1033 equipment coming into Arizona goes through 
the Payson Police Department and makes its way to 
state and local law enforcement agencies. A two-year 
investigation by the Arizona Republic revealed that one 
local agency, the Pinal County Sheriff ’s Office, doled 
out millions of dollars’ worth of military equipment to 
non-law enforcement agencies and planned to auction 
off some of its arsenal to raise revenue for itself.
A great deal of military-grade equipment in Arizona is 
ostensibly obtained for purposes of securing the U.S. 
border with Mexico, but the track record of federal grant 
programs suggests that this equipment may well be 
diverted to other activities, such as the investigations and 
warrants detailed elsewhere in this report. The bottom 
line is that Arizona law enforcement agencies at and well 
beyond the actual border have become unnecessarily 
and dangerously militarized. The Pinal County Sheriff ’s 
office, for example, obtained 94 rifles, two armored 
vehicles, and three helicopters. The Coconino County 
Sheriff ’s office obtained six armored vehicles, and the 
Mojave County Sheriff ’s office has four helicopters. 
Arizona law enforcement, designed to serve and protect 
communities, is instead equipped to wage a war.
Arming border communities for battle gives the 
ACLU serious cause for concern. For more on why the 
militarization of the United States-Mexican border is 
dangerous and counter-productive, see ACLU, “Border 
Communities Under Siege: Border Patrol Agents Ride 
Roughshod Over Civil Rights.”
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SWAT Raid Ends with Toddler 
in Medically-Induced Coma
After the Phonesavanh family’s home in Wisconsin burned down, they drove their minivan to stay with 
relatives in a small town just outside of Atlanta, Georgia. 
On the back windshield, the family pasted six stick figures: 
a dad, a mom, three young girls, and one baby boy.
This van, containing several car seats, was parked in the 
driveway of the home where they were staying when, just 
before 3:00am on a night in May of 2014, a team of SWAT 
officers armed with assault rifles burst into the room where 
the family was sleeping. Some of the kids’ toys were in the 
front yard, but the Habersham County and Cornelia police 
officers claimed they had no way of knowing children might 
be present. One of the officers threw a flashbang grenade 
into the room. It landed in Baby Bou Bou’s crib. 
It took several hours before Alecia and Bounkahm, the 
baby’s parents, were able to see their son. The 19-month-old 
had been taken to an intensive burn unit and placed into 
a medically induced coma. When the flashbang grenade 
exploded, it blew a hole in 19-month-old Bou Bou’s face 
and chest. The chest wound was so deep it exposed his ribs. 
The blast covered Bou Bou’s body in third degree burns. At 
the time of this report’s publication, three weeks after the 
raid, it was still unclear whether Baby Bou Bou would live. 
Bounkahm spent this Father’s Day in the hospital with his 
son.
The SWAT team was executing a “no knock” warrant to 
search for someone who did not live in the home that was 
raided: Bounkahm’s nephew, who was suspected of making 
a $50 drug sale. “After breaking down the door, throwing 
my husband to the ground, and screaming at my children, 
the officers–armed with M16s–filed through the house 
like they were playing war,” said Alecia. The officers did not 
find any guns or drugs in the house and no arrests were 
made. Bounkahm’s nephew was eventually arrested without 
“This is about race. You don’t 
see SWAT teams going into 
a white collar community, 
throwing grenades into their 
homes.”
        —Alecia Phonesavanh
“My three little girls are 
terrified of the police now. 
They don’t want to go to 
sleep because they’re 
afraid the cops will kill 
them or their family.”
                             —Alecia Phonesavanh
The crib where Baby Bou Bou was sleeping, damaged 
by an exploding flashbang grenade.
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Bounkham Phonesavanh, nicknamed “Baby Bou 
Bou,” loves French fries, the theme song from 
Frozen, and playing with his three older sisters.
Bounkahm and Alecia spent the three weeks 
following the raid at the hospital. At the time 
the report was published, their son was still in a 
medically-induced coma. 
incident at another location, holding a small amount of 
drugs on him.  
Bounkahm, the baby’s father, was born in Laos during 
wartime. He remembers communist soldiers breaking down 
the door of his childhood home. “It felt like that,” he said. 
“This is America and you’re supposed to be safe here, but 
you’re not even safe around the cops.” 
The Phonesavanhs have three daughters who are now scared 
to go to bed at night. One night after the raid, their 8-year-
old woke up in the middle of the night screaming, “No, don’t 
kill him! You’re hurting my brother! Don’t kill him.” Alecia 
and Bounkahm used to tell their kids that if they were ever in 
trouble, they should go to the police for help. “My three little 
girls are terrified of the police now. They don’t want to go to 
sleep because they’re afraid the cops will kill them or their 
family,” Alecia said. 
When asked about the prevalence of SWAT raids to fight 
the War on Drugs, Alecia told us, “This is all about race and 
class. You don’t see SWAT teams going into a white collar 
community, throwing grenades into their homes.” 
Learn more at www.justiceforbabyboubou.com.
“After breaking down 
the door, throwing my 
husband to the ground, 
and screaming at my 
children, the officers–
armed with M16s–filed 
through the house like 
they were playing war.”
     —Alecia Phonesavanh
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It is inappropriate for the U.S. military to be actively 
supporting the domestic War on Drugs, which has 
destroyed millions of lives, unfairly impacted communities 
of color, made drugs cheaper and more potent, caused 
countless deaths of innocent people caught up in drug 
war-related armed conflict, and failed to eliminate drug 
dependence and addiction. Even if an argument could be 
made that providing local law enforcement with military 
equipment for counterdrug purposes ever made sense—
which is dubious—there is no way to justify such policies 
today. Indeed, the U.S. Attorney General has suggested that 
the drug war has gone too far. Beginning in August 2013, 
Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., announced plans to 
curtail the use of mandatory minimum sentencing laws 
by federal prosecutors in certain drug cases, agreed not to 
challenge state laws allowing the medicinal or recreational 
use of marijuana, and supported a move by the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission to reduce many drug sentences.
The DOJ plays an important role in the militarization of 
the police through programs such as the Edward Byrne 
Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program. 
Established in 1988, the program, originally called the 
Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement 
American policing has become unnecessarily and dangerously militarized.10 For decades, the federal 
government has equipped state and local law enforcement 
agencies with military weapons and vehicles, as well as 
military tactical training, for the (often explicit) purpose of 
waging the War on Drugs. Not all communities are equally 
impacted by this phenomenon; the disproportionate 
impact of the War on Drugs in communities of color has 
been well documented.11 Police militarization can result in 
tragedy for both civilians and police officers, escalate the 
risks of needless violence, cause the destruction of personal 
property, and undermine civil liberties. Significantly, the 
militarization of American policing has been allowed to 
occur in the absence of public discourse or oversight.
The militarization of American policing has occurred as 
a direct result of federal programs that use equipment 
transfers and funding to encourage aggressive enforcement 
of the War on Drugs by state and local police agencies. One 
such program is the 1033 Program, launched in the 1990s 
during the heyday of the War on Drugs, which authorizes 
the U.S. Department of Defense to transfer military 
equipment to local law enforcement agencies.12 This 
program, originally enacted as part of the 1989 National 
Defense Authorization Act, initially authorized the transfer 
of equipment that was “suitable for use by such agencies 
in counterdrug activities.”13 In 1996, Congress made the 
program permanent and expanded the program’s scope to 
require that preference be given to transfers made for the 
purpose of “counterdrug and counterterrorism activities.”14  
There are few limitations or requirements imposed 
on agencies that participate in the 1033 Program.15 In 
addition, equipment transferred under the 1033 Program is 
free to receiving agencies, though they are required to pay 
for transport and maintenance. The federal government 
requires agencies that receive 1033 equipment to use it 
within one year of receipt,16 so there can be no doubt that 
participation in this program creates an incentive for law 
enforcement agencies to use military equipment. 
BACKGROUND
“The detection and countering 
of the production, trafficking, 
and use of illegal drugs is a 
high-priority national security 
mission of the Department  
of Defense.”
 —Then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, 198917
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prevention-related law enforcement activities,” though 
that phrase does not appear to be clearly defined.21 The 
stated justification for DHS grants to state and local 
law enforcement is to support efforts to protect against 
terrorism, but even the DHS acknowledges that it has a 
larger mission, which includes ordinary law enforcement 
activities. In 2010, the DHS announced a new “anticrime 
campaign,” which appears to have a minimal nexus to 
terrorism prevention.22 
By invoking the imagery of war, aggressively funding 
the enforcement of U.S. drug laws, and creating an over-
Assistance Program, provides states and local units of 
government with funding to improve the functioning of 
their criminal justice system and to enforce drug laws. JAG 
funding can be used for any of the following purposes:
■■ Law enforcement
■■ Courts (prosecution and indigent defense)
■■ Crime prevention and education
■■ Corrections and community corrections
■■ Drug treatment and enforcement
■■ Program planning, evaluation, and technology
■■ Crime victim and witness programs
However, JAG grantees spend much more of their funding 
on law enforcement than on other program areas. Between 
April 2012 and March 2013, JAG grantees spent 64 percent 
of their JAG funding on law enforcement. In contrast, 
grantees spent 9 percent on courts, including both 
prosecution and indigent defense, and a mere 5 percent 
on drug treatment and 6 percent on crime prevention 
and education.18 Grantees use a portion of JAG funds 
allocated to law enforcement to purchase numerous types 
of weapons. In 2012-2013, state and local agencies used 
JAG funds to purchase hundreds of lethal and less-lethal 
weapons, tactical vests, and body armor.19
The militarization phenomenon has gained even greater 
zeal since the events of September 11, 2001, the creation 
of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the 
declaration of the so-called “War on Terror.” Since the early 
2000s, the infusion of DHS money and assistance to state 
and local law enforcement anti-terrorism work has led to 
even more police militarization and even greater military-
law enforcement contact, and DHS grants have allowed 
police departments to stockpile specialized equipment in 
the name of anti-terror readiness. 
The main source of DHS funding to state and local law 
enforcement is the Homeland Security Grant Program 
(HSGP) and its two main components, the State Homeland 
Security Program (SHSP) and the Urban Areas Security 
Initiative (UASI).20 Both grant programs require recipients 
to dedicate at least 25 percent of grant funds to “terrorism 
CASUALTY REPORT
TUCSON, ARIZONA 
2011
SWAT Team Shoots Veteran 
22 Times 
Jose Guerena, a 26-year-old Iraq war veteran, 
returned home and crawled 
into bed after working the 
graveyard shift at the Asarco 
Mission mine. Around 
9:30am, his wife became 
nervous when she heard 
strange noises and saw the 
outline of a man standing outside her window. 
She woke Guerena, who asked his wife to hide 
in a closet with their 4-year-old son. Guerena 
picked up his rifle, with the safety on, and went 
to investigate. A SWAT team fired 71 shots at 
Guerena, 22 of which entered his body and 
killed him. Guerena died on his kitchen floor, 
without medical attention. The SWAT officers 
raided multiple homes in the neighborhood, 
and in another home they did find a small 
bag of marijuana. No drugs were found in the 
Guerenas’ home.
18 American Civil Liberties Union
Some fully embrace militarism in policing: “We trainers 
have spent the past decade trying to ingrain in our students 
the concept that the American police officer works a 
battlefield every day he patrols his sector.”23 The most 
common rationale put forth to support the notion that 
the police in fact should be militarized is to protect life: 
“A warrior cop’s mission is to protect every life possible 
and to only use force when it’s necessary to accomplish 
that mission.”24 Others suggest that policing has in fact not 
become militarized at all: “Advocates from every corner 
of the political compass have produced a mountain of 
disinformation about the ‘militarization’ of American law 
enforcement.”25 Still others express concern that American 
policing has become too militarized; Salt Lake City police 
chief Chris Burbank recently stated, “We’re not the military. 
Nor should we look like an invading force coming in.”26 
Diane Goldstein, a retired lieutenant, agrees. Speaking of 
the drug war zeal of the 1980s, she stated that “[The] ever-
increasing federalization of what traditionally had been 
a state and local law enforcement effort received massive 
funding as politicians, presidents and the Drug Czar 
increased the rhetoric of war.” Even the U.S. Department 
of Justice has questioned the wisdom of militarizing local 
police departments: “According to the U.S. Department 
of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Report on State and 
Local Law Enforcement Training Academies (BJS Report), 
the majority of police recruits receive their training in 
academies with a stress-based military orientation. This 
begs the question; is this military model—designed to 
prepare young recruits for combat—the appropriate 
mechanism for teaching our police trainees how to garner 
community trust and partner with citizens to solve crime 
and public order problems?”27
One of the more dramatic examples of police militarization 
is the use of SWAT and other paramilitary teams to 
conduct ordinary law enforcement activities.28 SWAT 
teams were created in the late 1960s as “quasi-militaristic” 
squads capable of addressing serious and violent situations 
that presented imminent threats such as riots, barricade 
and hostage scenarios, and active shooter or sniper 
situations.29 The first SWAT team, at the Los Angeles Police 
Department, was developed in the wake of a series of 
emergency situations in which local police felt unable to 
respond as swiftly or as effectively as was necessary.30 SWAT 
teams have since expanded in number, and are used with 
hyped fear of siege from within our borders, the federal 
government has justified and encouraged the militarization 
of local law enforcement. The ACLU found throughout the 
course of this investigation that the excessive militarism 
in policing, particularly through the use of paramilitary 
policing teams, escalates the risk of violence, threatens 
individual liberties, and unfairly impacts people of color. 
In addition, because use of unnecessarily aggressive 
techniques has a documented impact on public confidence 
in law enforcement, there is reason to be concerned that 
excessive militarization undermines public trust and 
community safety as well.
Interestingly, members of the law enforcement community 
are far from unified on the topic of police militarization. 
INCIDENT REPORT
GWINNETT COUNTY, GEORGIA 
JUNE 23, 2012
Full SWAT Team Deployed, 
Despite Presence of 
Children and Elderly
In a search for marijuana, a SWAT team raided a home at 6:00 in the morning. Despite the fact 
that the department had previously decided that 
a SWAT deployment was unnecessary in this 
case, officers used the fact that one of the people 
thought to be in the home had been convicted 
of weapon possession in 2005 in another state 
as the basis for concluding people inside the 
residence might be armed. Therefore, the 
department changed its mind and deemed a full 
SWAT deployment necessary, despite knowing 
that there were likely to be children and an 
elderly woman present in the home when they 
executed the warrant. There is no indication as 
to whether any guns or weapons were found 
after the home was raided. All but one of the 
people thought to be involved were Black. 
19War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing
that the police would not be violating their constitutional 
rights, but the fact that the Chief of Police felt comfortable 
announcing a plan for police officers on routine patrol 
to stop and question residents without justification 
while dressed in SWAT gear and carrying AR-15s is a 
foreboding sign. While unquestionably of grave concern, 
routine patrols using SWAT gear, stop-and-frisk,32 and 
other aggressive policing tactics are beyond the scope of 
this report. Another important area is the use of military 
surveillance equipment and other forms of intelligence 
gathering, which also falls outside the scope of this report.33 
Finally, the militarization of the U.S. border is a critically 
important issue; we touch on this in our discussion of the 
enormous caches of weapons Arizona law enforcement 
agencies have received through the 1033 Program, but the 
broader issue of border militarization is also outside the 
scope of this report.34
This report builds on a body of existing work establishing 
that police militarization is indeed a problem. For example, 
Dr. Peter Kraska, Professor of Justice Studies at Eastern 
Kentucky University, has surveyed police departments 
across the country on their use of SWAT teams and 
estimates that the number of SWAT teams in small towns 
grew from 20 percent in the 1980s to 80 percent in the 
mid-2000s, and that as of the late 1990s, almost 90 percent 
of larger cities had them. He also estimates that the number 
of SWAT raids per year grew from 3,000 in the 1980s to 
45,000 in the mid-2000s.35 David Klinger and Jeff Rojek, 
both at the University of Missouri-St. Louis’s Department 
of Criminology and Criminal Justice, conducted a study 
using SWAT data from 1986 to 1998 and found that the 
overwhelming number of SWAT deployments studied were 
for the purpose of executing a warrant (34,271 for warrant 
service, in contrast to 7,384 for a barricaded suspect and 
1,180 for hostage-taking cases).36 
Some scholars have proposed additional analytic 
frameworks for examining the militarization of policing. 
For example, Abigail R. Hall and Christopher J. Coyne, 
both in the Department of Economics of George Mason 
University, have developed a “political economy” of the 
militarization of policing.37 In addition, Stephen M. Hill 
and Randall R. Beger, both professors in the Political 
Science Department at the University of Wisconsin-Eau 
Claire, place the issue within an international context, 
greater frequency and, increasingly, for purposes for which 
they were not originally intended—overwhelmingly to 
serve search warrants in drug investigations.
Of course, aggressive policing tactics extend well beyond 
the scope of this report, and examples of particularly 
aggressive policing, in which police officers appear more 
as an invading force than as protectors of a community, 
abound. Take Paragould, Arkansas, where at a December 
2012 town hall meeting, Chief of Police Todd Stovall 
announced that police conducting routine patrols would 
“be in SWAT gear and have AR-15s around their neck.”31 
He also asserted that the police would be stopping anyone 
they wanted to and that the fear of crime in Paragould 
gave his officers probable cause to stop anyone at any 
time, for any reason or no reason at all. Chief Stovall later 
issued a statement reassuring the residents of Paragould 
Salt Lake City police chief 
Chris Burbank recently 
stated, “We’re not the military. 
Nor should we look like an 
invading force coming in.”
It is not unusual for family pets to be shot 
unnecessarily.
Photo: Keep Columbia Free via FIO/Sunshine request  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ng6mfpZ2kR4
20 American Civil Liberties Union
This report should not be read as an indictment of the 
police generally or of any individual police officers. It is also 
not an argument against the use of SWAT in appropriate 
circumstances—some scenarios undoubtedly merit an 
emergency response, and SWAT teams are often the best 
equipped to handle those scenarios. Finally, the report 
should not be understood to suggest that the incidents 
uncovered during the course of the ACLU’s investigation 
did not necessarily merit some form of law enforcement 
response—many did. Instead, we argue that American law 
enforcement can reverse the militarization trend in a way 
that promotes safe and effective policing strategies without 
undermining public confidence in law enforcement.
arguing that the militarization of domestic policing is part 
of a broader “paramilitary policing juggernaut.”38 Journalist 
Radley Balko discusses the issue of police militarization at 
length in his recent book “Rise of the Warrior Cop” and 
the topic has received considerable, if episodic, attention 
in the mainstream media.39 Our analysis adds to this body 
of work by incorporating an analysis of raw data—actual 
SWAT incident reports collected from numerous law 
enforcement agencies across the country. 
From our review of both primary and secondary source 
materials, we are able to present two types of findings: one 
set of general findings based on our review of the existing 
research, which our data supports, and one set of time-
bound specific findings from our statistical analysis of the 
raw data we collected in connection with our investigation. 
As explained in more detail below, our more general 
findings are that policing in the Unites States has become 
excessively militarized and that this militarization has 
occurred with almost no transparency, accountability, or 
oversight. We also found, based on our analysis of the raw 
data we collected, that of the SWAT deployments studied, 
(1) the overwhelming majority were for the purpose of 
searching people’s homes for drugs, (2) troubling racial 
disparities existed, and (3) the use of violent tactics and 
equipment often resulted in property damage and/or 
bodily harm.
American law enforcement can 
reverse the militarization trend 
in a way that promotes safe and 
effective policing strategies 
without undermining public 
confidence in law enforcement.
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distract the occupants of a building while a SWAT team 
is attempting to secure the scene.42 Flashbang grenades 
produce an extremely bright flash of light that temporarily 
overstimulates the retina and causes temporary blindness 
(lasting 5 to 10 seconds). They also make a deafening 
noise that makes people feel disoriented and can cause a 
lingering ringing. Although they are generally considered to 
be nonlethal, they have been known to set homes on fire43 
and induce heart attacks,44 both sometimes resulting in 
death. In 2010, 7-year-old Aiyana Stanley-Jones was killed 
when, just after midnight, a SWAT team threw a flashbang 
grenade through the window into the living room where 
she was asleep. The flashbang burned her blanket and a 
member of the SWAT team burst into the house, firing a 
single shot, which killed her.45 
Both battering rams and flashbang grenades can cause 
extensive property damage—half of the incidents the 
ACLU reviewed involved property damage such as damage 
to doors and/or windows (in another 30 percent of cases, 
it was impossible to know whether there was property 
damage in connection with a SWAT deployment, so the 
Policing and Militarism
FINDING #1
Policing—particularly through the use 
of paramilitary teams—in the United 
States today has become excessively 
militarized, mainly through federal 
programs that create incentives 
for state and local police to use 
unnecessarily aggressive weapons and 
tactics designed for the battlefield.
Use of Military Equipment by SWAT Teams
It is clear from this investigation and other research40 that 
American policing has become excessively militarized. 
We can see this in the use of military-style equipment—
weapons and tactics designed for the battlefield—to 
conduct ordinary law enforcement activities. Police officers 
use these weapons routinely, across the United States, to 
force their way into the people’s homes, disrupting lives 
and destroying communities.
One such weapon is the battering ram—“a large and heavy 
piece of wood or other material that is used to hit and 
break through walls and doors”41—which is nearly always 
carried on deployments, and the primary tool used to 
breach doors and windows (though explosive breaching—
the use of explosives to cut through doors—seems to be 
gaining popularity). 
Another device often used by SWAT teams is the 
flashbang grenade (sometimes referred to generically as a 
“distraction device”), an explosive device that is used to 
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
Aiyana Stanley-Jones
Photo: Family of Aiyana Stanley-Jones
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In 2013, the Department of Defense started giving away 
MRAPs through the 1033 Program. According to the 
Department of Defense, MRAPs are designed to protect 
occupants against armor-piercing roadside bombs.47 In 
2007, the United States spent $50 billion to produce 27,000 
MRAPs and deploy them to Iraq and Afghanistan.48 No 
longer needed overseas, MRAPs have made their way 
into local communities. Because the ACLU launched this 
investigation in early 2013 and requested records only 
from 2011-2012, we did not ask the jurisdictions studied 
to send documentation of MRAP requests, so it is not 
possible to know from this investigation how many towns 
have acquired such vehicles through the 1033 Program. 
Media accounts put the number at around 500.49 Dallas, 
Texas, has one.50 So does Salinas, California,51 as well as the 
Utah Highway Patrol.52 And, perhaps most bizarrely, the 
Ohio State University Police has one—in order to provide 
“presence” on football game days.53
Military Training
The militarization of policing culture is also apparent 
in the training that tactical teams receive—SWAT team 
members are trained to think like soldiers. The ACLU 
asked hundreds of law enforcement agencies to submit 
copies of SWAT training materials. One response from the 
Farmington, Missouri, Special Response Team consisted 
of a piece written by Senior PoliceOne Contributor 
Chuck Remsberg for Killology Research Group. The piece 
summarizes a presentation given at a conference of the 
International Association of Law Enforcement Firearms 
Instructors and warns that “preparations for attacks on 
American schools that will bring rivers of blood and 
staggering body counts are well underway in Islamic 
total may be higher). SWAT incident reports almost never 
included an estimate of the amount of damage, and none 
of the incident reports reviewed suggested that the owners 
or residents of a home damaged by use of a battering ram 
or flashbang grenade would be reimbursed for repairs.
When SWAT teams deploy, they typically wear combat 
helmets and “battle dress uniforms” (BDUs), fatigues 
designed for use by the U.S. Army throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s. The ACLU documented a total of 15,054 battle 
uniforms or other personal protective equipment received 
by 63 responding agencies during the relevant time period. 
The use of BDUs is another trend in the militarization 
of policing; as retired police officer Bill Donelly stated in 
a letter to the editor in the Washington Post, “One tends 
to throw caution to the wind when wearing ‘commando-
chic’ regalia, a bulletproof vest with the word ‘POLICE’ 
emblazoned on both sides, and when one is armed 
with high tech weaponry…Police agencies face tactical 
challenges that do require a specialized and technically 
proficient team approach, but fortunately these incidents 
are relatively infrequent even in the largest cities. It would 
appear that U.S. law enforcement, even in the smallest 
and safest communities, is suffering from a collective 
‘inferiority complex’ that can be relieved only by military-
style clothing and arsenals of formidable firepower.”46
Another piece of equipment that seems to be gaining 
popularity among SWAT teams is the armored personnel 
carrier (APC). APCs were created to transport infantry and 
provide protection from shrapnel and small arms fire on 
the battlefield. One version popular with law enforcement 
agencies is the Ballistic Engineered Armored Response 
Counter Attack (BearCat) APC, but more modern APCs 
include the MRAP (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected) 
vehicle, which provides additional protection from 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In the battlefield, 
APCs are typically armed with machine guns mounted 
on top of the vehicle in a turret; when used domestically, 
the guns are removed and the vehicle is used primarily 
for protection by law enforcement responding to SWAT 
call-outs and emergencies. Thus, APCs are not typically 
armed when in use by domestic law enforcement; however, 
they appear threatening and observers do not necessarily 
have reason to know whether an APC is armed. 
Police in South Carolina pose with their Bearcat
Photo: Supplied by Lt. Chris Cowan
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less as civilians and more as enemies, what effect does that 
have on police-suspect interactions?
Legality of Forced Entry Into People’s 
Homes
Generally speaking, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution prohibits the police from entering a person’s 
home without a warrant. Historically, if the police had a 
warrant to search a person’s home, they were required by 
law to knock on the door, announce their presence, and 
wait for someone to answer.55 When a person answered 
terrorist camps.” It further states that “police agencies aren’t 
used to this…We deal with acts of a criminal nature. This 
is an act of war, but because of our laws we can’t depend 
on the military to help us…[T]he U.S. in [sic] the one 
nation in the world where the military is not the first line 
of defense against domestic terrorist attack. By law, you 
the police officer are our Delta Force.” It provides “‘4 Ds’ 
for Thwarting Terrorists’ Plans to Massacre Our School 
Children” and concludes with an admonition to “Build the 
right mind-set in your troops.”54
Even if there were merit to the argument that training 
SWAT teams to think like soldiers in the context of a school 
shooting would provide them with the skills that they need 
to respond effectively, it appears that training in how to 
develop a “warrior” mentality is pervasive and extends well 
beyond hostage situations and school shootings, seeping 
into officers’ everyday interactions with their communities. 
For example, the Cary, North Carolina, SWAT team 
provides a training session explicitly titled “Warrior 
Mindset/Chemical Munitions” for all Emergency Response 
Team personnel. A PowerPoint training presentation sent 
by the National Tactical Officers Association urges trainees 
to “Steel Your Battlemind” and defines “battlemind” as “a 
warrior’s inner strength to face fear and adversity during 
combat with courage. It is the will to persevere and win. It 
is resilience.” Neither of these training documents suggests 
that SWAT teams should constrain their soldier-like tactics 
to terrorism situations. Additionally, in the documents 
reviewed for this report, the majority of SWAT raids took 
place in the context of serving search warrants at people’s 
homes—not in response to school shootings or bombings.
Training programs like these impact how some SWAT 
officers view the people in their communities. For example, 
in one of the cases examined for this report, a SWAT team 
drove a BearCat APC into a neighborhood for the sole 
purpose of executing a warrant to search for drugs. Once 
the SWAT officers arrived at the home, they drove the APC 
to the residence, broke down the front and back doors, 
destroyed a glass table, deployed a distraction device, 
and pried a lock off a shed, all to find the house empty. 
One of the officers noted in his report that the house was 
“empty of suspects and civilians.” The distinction between 
“suspects” and “civilians” is telling. If police see suspects 
INCIDENT REPORT
BURLINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA 
NOVEMBER 13, 2012
SWAT Officers Shoots Dog 
During No-Knock Raid
At 6:00 in the morning, a SWAT officer shot a dog during a no-knock raid and search of a 
home. The suspect was a single Black male who 
was suspected of selling marijuana at his home. 
Solely on the basis of information provided 
by a confidential informant (which is often 
unreliable), the SWAT team believed that the 
man possessed firearms. No information was 
provided about what kind or how many firearms 
the man was believed to possess. The team 
deployed a distraction device and broke down the 
door, causing damage and surprise. They found 
two unarmed men inside, along with a dog that 
bit one of the officers. The officer was carrying 
a shotgun, against the team’s own policy. Using 
this shotgun, the officer shot the dog. Seventy 
percent of the people impacted by the Burlington 
SWAT deployments the ACLU studied were 
Black.
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do not offer robust protection from police use of aggressive 
equipment and tactics to execute search warrants in 
people’s homes.
Federal Incentives to Militarize Policing
The Department of Defense operates the 1033 Program 
through the Defense Logistics Agency’s (DLA) Law 
Enforcement Support Office (LESO), whose motto is 
“from warfighter to crimefighter.” According to LESO, 
the program has transferred $4.3 billion worth of 
property through the 1033 Program.61 Today, the 1033 
Program includes more than 17,000 federal and state law 
enforcement agencies from all U.S. states and territories. 
The amount of military equipment being used by local and 
state police agencies has increased dramatically—the value 
of property transferred though the program went from $1 
million in 1990 to $324 million in 1995 and to nearly $450 
million in 2013.62 
The 1033 statute authorizes the Department of Defense 
to transfer property that is “excess to the needs of the 
Department,”63 which can include new equipment; in 
fact, 36 percent of the property transferred pursuant the 
program is brand new.64 Thus, it appears that DLA can 
simply purchase property from an equipment or weapons 
manufacturer and transfer it to a local law enforcement 
agency free of charge. Given that more than a third of 
property transferred under the program is in fact new, it 
appears that this practice happens with some regularity. 
A statistical analysis of the transfer of equipment under 
the 1033 Program is beyond the scope of this report, but 
we uncovered numerous examples of transfers that give 
cause for concern. For example, during the years covered 
by the investigation, the North Little Rock, Arkansas, police 
obtained at least 34 automatic and semi-automatic rifles, 
two MARCbots (robots designed for use in Afghanistan 
that are capable of being armed), several ground troop 
helmets, and a Mamba tactical vehicle.65 The Arkansas 
state coordinator found that the LESO application for 
participation and the state memorandum of agreement 
were outdated, in addition to many weapons being 
unaccounted for in the inventory. Despite this, the 
coordinator signed off on a form that said all the inventory 
the door, the police were required to show the warrant and 
were then entitled to demand entry to conduct a search. 
Although the “knock-and-announce” rule still exists, 
today police executing a search warrant need not follow 
the rule if they have “reasonable suspicion” that the 
circumstances present a threat of physical violence or that 
evidence would be destroyed if advance notice were given.56 
Further, if they believe in advance of executing the search 
warrant that either of these circumstances will exist, they 
can obtain a “no-knock warrant,” which allows them to 
enter a person’s home without knocking. In either case, 
the police are permitted to force their way into a person’s 
home.  As a consequence, even though the police are not 
allowed to barge their way into a person’s home simply 
because they believe drugs are present,57 given that any 
time they have reasonable suspicion that knocking and 
announcing their presence would “inhibit the investigation 
of the crime by … allowing the destruction of evidence,”58 
the reality is that drug cases often provide police with 
vast discretion to use forced entry into a person’s home 
to execute a search warrant. Even when a court finds that 
the police have violated the knock-and-announce rule, 
the Supreme Court has held that the prosecution can still 
use the evidence seized as a result of a subsequent search 
at trial, significantly diluting the knock-and-announce 
requirement’s value as a deterrent to police overreach.59 
While search warrants authorize the police to search a 
given place for a particular item or items, they rarely 
delineate the tactics the police may use in executing 
the warrant (other than no-knock warrants, which, as 
explained above, authorize the police to enter without 
knocking or announcing their presence, and sometimes 
specifically authorize use of a night-time search). And 
though the Supreme Court has held as a general matter 
that the method of police entry into a home is a factor 
to be considered in assessing the reasonableness (and, 
hence, constitutionality) of the search,60 there is no per se 
prohibition on the use of any particular method. Therefore, 
the fact that the police obtained a warrant in a given case 
does little to constrain their broad discretion to decide 
whether to deploy a SWAT team, break down a door with a 
battering ram, deploy a distraction device, etc.
In sum, while courts can at times provide recourse to 
violations of Fourth Amendment rights, by and large they 
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increased the likelihood that local police departments, not 
just in Gwinnett County but across the country, will deploy 
military weapons and tactics in drug investigations when 
possible.
Mission Creep
It is clear that local law enforcement agencies use DHS 
funds ostensibly obtained for the purpose of fighting 
terrorism to conduct ordinary law enforcement 
activities. In New Hampshire, for example, three police 
departments—in Concord, Keene, and Manchester (cities 
that are separated from each other by approximately 30 
miles)—each used DHS grants to fund the purchase of an 
armored BearCat (the amount of grants received by these 
agencies ranged from $215,000 to $286,000). Justifications 
offered for these grants included prevention, protection, 
response, and recovery activities pertaining to weapons of 
mass destruction and the threat of terrorism. The Keene, 
New Hampshire, police department, for example, stated 
in its application for DHS grant funding to purchase an 
APC that “[t]he terrorism threat is far reaching and often 
unforeseen. Terrorist’s [sic] goals, regardless of affiliation, 
forms were accurate. Bay County, Florida, received several 
military-style rifles, a forklift, and several utility trucks. 
The same county also has on inventory numerous M-16s, 
M-14s, sniper rifles, submachine guns, and ballistic shields, 
though it is not clear from the records whether Bay County 
obtained those items through the 1033 Program, from 
another federal source, or otherwise. Gwinnett County, 
Georgia, received nearly 60 military-style rifles, as well as 
numerous combat vests and Kevlar helmets.
In addition, agencies are permitted to transfer equipment 
obtained through the 1033 Program between each other. 
The ACLU uncovered numerous examples of state and 
local law enforcement agencies transferring equipment that 
they had obtained through the 1033 Program. There do not 
appear to be any limitations on or oversight of this practice.
As the saying goes, if all you have is a hammer, everything 
looks like a nail.66 Likewise, if the federal government gives 
the police a huge cache of military-style weaponry, they 
are highly likely to use it, even if they do not really need 
to. Gwinnett County, Georgia, for example, received at 
least 57 semi-automatic rifles, mostly M-16s and M-14s, 
through the 1033 Program during the relevant time period. 
A third of Gwinnett County’s SWAT deployments were for 
drug investigations; in half of them, the SWAT team broke 
down the door to get inside, and there was no record in 
any of the reports that weapons were found. In several of 
these cases, damage resulted to people’s homes; in one case, 
the SWAT team deployed tear gas into a home in order to 
serve an arrest warrant, knowing there were people inside 
who were not subjects of the warrant. It is not possible to 
prove definitively that the weapons procured through the 
1033 Program incentivized these deployments in Gwinnett. 
However, it is reasonable to infer that the program—the 
very purpose of which is to equip local police officers 
to use military equipment in drug investigations—has 
 “Our application talked about  
the danger of domestic 
terrorism, but that’s just 
something you put in the grant 
application to get the money. 
What red-blooded American 
cop isn’t going to be excited 
about getting a toy like this? 
That’s what it comes down to.”
   —Keene, N.H. Citty Councilmember
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from the DHS and DOJ during the time period studied. 
The city of Austin, Texas, for example, received $2.2 million 
in federal grant funding from August 2010 through January 
2012. Fort Worth, Texas, received $1.2 million in 2011 and 
2012 combined. Similarly, since August 2013, the Salt Lake 
City Police Department has received almost $2 million in 
federal grant awards. However, awards are not limited to 
large cities. In Montana, the Helena Police Department 
received $733,000 in DHS grants, and the Montana 
Department of Justice received more than $1 million 
in DHS grants. Likewise, Gastonia, North Carolina, has 
received more than $180,000 in federal funding since 2009, 
while the Bay County, Florida, Sheriff ’s Department has 
received approximately $360,000 in federal funding since 
late 2011. In 2011, the Raleigh Police Department received 
$120,000 as part of the 2011 State Homeland Security 
Program. 
A 2004 classified memo all but confirms the blurring of 
the lines between the drug war and the U.S. military by 
calling the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) The “Other” 
Warfighter and stating that the War on Drugs “has all the 
risks, excitement, and dangers of conventional warfare.74
Simply put, American policing has become excessively 
militarized.
usually encompass the creation of fear among the public, 
convincing the public that their Government is powerless 
to stop the terrorists, and get immediate publicity for their 
cause.” The application goes on to cite Keene’s annual 
pumpkin festival as a potential terrorism target in need of 
protection with an APC.67 
Not even Keene city officials believed that the city actually 
needed the BearCat to thwart terrorism. To explain why the 
police included the word “terrorism” on their application 
for federal funding for this purchase, a city councilmember 
said, “Our application talked about the danger of domestic 
terrorism, but that’s just something you put in the grant 
application to get the money. What red-blooded American 
cop isn’t going to be excited about getting a toy like this? 
That’s what it comes down to.”68
The police chief in San Diego, California, expressed the 
same sentiment when asked about his agency’s decision 
to purchase an armored personnel carrier: “‘If we had to 
take on a terrorist group, we could do that,’ said William 
Lansdowne, the police chief in San Diego and a member of 
the board of the Major Cities Chiefs Association. Though 
his force used federal grants to buy one of those fancy 
armored vehicles—complete with automatic-gun portals—
he said the apparatus was more useful for traditional 
crime-busting than counter-terrorism.”69
It is equally clear that the DOJ’s Byrne JAG funding is being 
used to conduct unnecessarily aggressive activities in drug 
cases. Approximately 21 percent of all law enforcement 
JAG funds go to task forces, the majority of which are drug 
task forces, which routinely employ paramilitary tactics in 
drug investigations.70 Byrne JAG drug task forces have been 
widely criticized for incentivizing unnecessarily aggressive, 
often militarized, tactics—particularly in communities 
of color.71 As of 2011, 585 multi-jurisdictional task forces 
were funded through the JAG program.72 JAG funds often 
support drug task forces by paying for the salaries or 
overtime hours of task force officers as well as for vehicles 
and equipment; in 2012-2013, more than 680,000 law 
enforcement overtime hours were paid for using JAG 
funds.73
According to documents uncovered by the ACLU, local law 
enforcement agencies often received substantial funding 
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It strains credibility to believe that the information 
contained in SWAT incident reports contains “trade 
secrets.” A trade secret is a commercially valuable plan, 
formula, process, or device. It is “a secret, commercially 
valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is used 
for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing 
of trade commodities and that can be said to be the end 
product of either innovation or substantial effort.”76 
A police report is not a “commercially valuable plan.” 
Furthermore, most law enforcement agencies contacted 
did in fact provide some records, belying the notion that 
the records requested did not constitute “public records,” 
that there were legitimate concerns about law enforcement 
effectiveness, or that the request was “overbroad and 
voluminous.” These are simply excuses to avoid complying 
with the ACLU’s request. In fact, the public should not 
even have to resort to public records requests to obtain 
information about policing practices—this information 
should be readily available.
The records that were produced revealed an extremely 
troubling trend: that data collecting and reporting in 
the context of SWAT was at best sporadic and at worst 
virtually nonexistent. Not a single law enforcement agency 
in this investigation provided records containing all of 
the information that the ACLU believes is necessary to 
undertake a thorough examination of police militarization. 
Some agencies (e.g., Tupelo, Mississippi) provided 
records that were nearly totally lacking in important 
information. Others (e.g., Salt Lake City, Utah) provided 
records that were quite lengthy, though still incomplete 
and extremely difficult to analyze because of their lack of 
organization. Others (e.g., Fort Worth, Texas) provide fairly 
comprehensive information, though often in narrative 
form, making statistical analysis difficult. This variation 
has two immediate results: (1) any analysis of the data 
will necessarily have to contend with a large number of 
Lack of Transparency 
and Oversight
FINDING #2
The militarization of policing in the 
United States has occurred with 
almost no public oversight.
Limitations of Data Collection on SWAT Use
Data concerning the prevalence of SWAT is difficult to 
collect.75 The ACLU filed public records requests with 
more than 255 law enforcement agencies during the course 
of this investigation. One hundred and fourteen of the 
agencies denied the ACLU’s request, either in full or in part. 
Even if the ACLU had received and examined responsive 
documents from all 255 law enforcement agencies that 
received public records requests, this would represent only 
a sliver of the more than 17,000 law enforcement agencies 
that exist throughout the United States, and thus would 
shine only a dim light on the extent of police militarization 
throughout the country.
The agencies that refused to comply with our requests 
offered various justifications for the refusals, including the 
following:
■■ The requested documents contained trade secrets.
■■ Concerns about jeopardizing law enforcement 
effectiveness.
■■ The requested documents did not constitute “public 
records.”
■■ The request was “overbroad and voluminous.”
■■ The costs associated with producing the documents 
were simply prohibitive. 
Data collecting and reporting in 
the context of SWAT was at best 
sporadic and at worst virtually 
nonexistent.
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agency failed to comply with the reporting provisions, the 
fact of noncompliance by that particular agency would be 
reported to the state legislature.79 Utah enacted a similar 
bill this year.80 
The Maryland law did not come out of nowhere. The year 
before, the Prince George’s County Sheriff ’s SWAT team 
had raided the home of Cheye Calvo, the mayor of a small 
Prince George’s County municipality. The county police 
department then held Calvo and his family at gunpoint for 
hours and killed his two dogs, on the basis of a misguided 
investigation in which Calvo and his wife were wrongly 
suspected of being involved in a marijuana transaction.81 
Calvo responded by drafting legislation, securing bill 
sponsors, attracting media, organizing grass-roots support, 
coordinating with other SWAT victims, knocking on doors, 
and personally appealing to the governor to sign the new 
law (over the objection of law enforcement), all a testament 
to the concerted efforts that must be taken to bring about 
SWAT reform. Although in the end the law did not contain 
everything he wanted, Calvo hoped that the law would 
bring change. He testified before the state legislature: “This 
bill is an important first step that doesn’t restrict [police] 
use [of SWAT teams]. It merely brings transparency. 
Hopefully, it will ensure that the people who fund and 
authorize these SWAT teams have the information they 
need to set good public policy.”82 
The Maryland law resulted in some fairly robust reporting 
on SWAT use by local law enforcement. The Governor’s 
Office of Crime Control and Prevention was able to 
collect, aggregate, analyze, and report on this data annually 
for the years 2010-2012, and more reports should be 
forthcoming.83 Highlighting the importance of thorough 
documentation and transparency, these reports, which are 
available to the public, demonstrated that in Maryland, 
SWAT deployments are used principally for search 
warrants, focus on nonviolent felonies and misdemeanors, 
and typically result in forced entries, regardless of whether 
the warrant is standard or no-knock. Unfortunately, the 
story seems to end there, at least in Maryland. The state 
legislature has not used the information contained in the 
reports to enact any meaningful policy reform, as Calvo 
had hoped, and the law is scheduled to sunset this year, 
with no indication that it will be extended (though both 
the Prince George’s police and the Prince George’s Sheriff ’s 
unknowns (as demonstrated above) and (2) it makes 
systematic, thorough, and uniform collection of SWAT 
data, at any level of government, impossible.
Lack of State and Local Oversight
There is almost no oversight of SWAT at the state or local 
level. Maryland is the exception—in 2009, Maryland 
enacted a law requiring law enforcement agencies that 
maintain a SWAT team to report, semi-annually, specific 
activation and deployment information.77 The law required 
the Police Training Commission, in consultation with the 
Governor’s Office of Crime Control and Prevention, to 
develop a standardized format for each agency to use in 
reporting data.78 It also provided that if a law enforcement 
INCIDENT REPORT
BAY COUNTY, FLORIDA 
JANUARY 6, 2011
SWAT Team Shatters 
Windows for to Search  
for Marijuana
Officers had no reason to believe that the man they suspected of selling marijuana out of 
his home was armed. Yet, they still classified 
their investigation as “high risk” to justify 
deploying a SWAT team.  Instead of knocking 
and demanding to search the premises, the 
SWAT team burst into the man’s home, igniting 
a flashbang grenade, shattering a window, 
and breaking down the man’s front door. The 
suspect was not inside the home at the time 
of the raid, but a different man, a woman, and 
an infant were, none of whom were suspects in 
the investigation. The suspect was found in the 
backyard. No guns or weapons were found.
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crime, victimization, justice employment information 
(e.g., the number of people employed by various criminal 
justice agencies), and information pertaining to justice 
systems on tribal lands.84 It collects and publishes some 
information pertaining to law enforcement administration, 
but mostly in the areas of training, coroner activities, crime 
laboratories, and a slew of other categories that do not 
pertain directly to the militarization of policing. While BJS 
does collect information on some policing activity, such as 
hate crimes, it does not collect information pertaining to 
incidents of SWAT deployment, uses of military weapons 
or tactics in connection with such deployments, or the 
underlying purposes of such deployments.85 Taking 
responsibility for collecting, maintaining, and analyzing 
information pertaining to the use of SWAT teams 
throughout the country would present certain challenges 
for BJS, but if local agencies improved their own record 
keeping on the use of SWAT—potentially aided by BJS 
through development of a data collection tool—BJS would 
enhance its ability to compile, aggregate, and analyze data 
collected and provided by local agencies.
Oversight of the federal programs that incentivize 
militarized policing is also needed.
Oversight of the 1033 Program exists, but there are gaps.86 
The only significant responsibilities placed on participating 
law enforcement agencies are that they not sell equipment 
obtained through the program and that they maintain 
accurate inventories of transferred equipment.
The state coordinator is required to approve or disapprove 
applications for participation, but there appear to be only 
two criteria that must be satisfied in order for a request 
to be approved: (1) that the agency intends to use the 
equipment for a “law enforcement purpose” (counterdrug 
and counterterrorism efforts are emphasized by law); and 
(2) that the transfer would result in a “fair and equitable 
distribution” of property based on current inventory. The 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) also provides that 
as a general matter, “no more than one of any item per 
officer will be allocated.”87 Most of the state coordinator’s 
other responsibilities are administrative in nature (e.g., 
ensuring that LESO has current and accurate points of 
contact, that only authorized agency requests are submitted 
office will continue to provide the data required by the law 
as a condition of a lawsuit Calvo brought after the raid). 
Calvo has expressed disappointment that elected officials 
have not used the data to mandate reforms. Putting aside 
the limitations of Maryland’s law, it should not take an 
incident like the raid on the Calvos’ home to get this kind 
of oversight.
At the local level, among the agencies that submitted 
documents pertaining to their policies and procedures to 
the ACLU, most had some form of after-action reporting 
or internal review procedures in place that varied in terms 
of the amount of oversight provided. For example, in Cary, 
North Carolina, all specialty assignments, including the 
SWAT team, are required to conduct an annual review 
containing a statement of purpose for the specialty 
assignment, evaluation of the initial conditions that 
required implementation of the specialized assignment, 
and justification for the continuation of the specialized 
assignment. In Huntington, West Virginia, the Office of 
Professional Standards is required to present findings 
regarding all incidents to the chief of police in an annual 
report. Many other SWAT teams are subject to similar 
internal oversight.
However, as discussed above, the after-action reports we 
received were, for the most part, woefully incomplete, 
raising serious questions about their utility for internal 
review of SWAT deployment practices. Furthermore, the 
records indicated that internal reviews mostly pertain to 
proper weapons use and training and not to evaluating 
important civil rights implications of SWAT use. In 
addition, purely internal oversight is insufficient to guard 
against excessive, aggressive, and disproportionate use of 
SWAT. Greater oversight is needed. 
Lack of Federal Oversight
In addition to insufficient state oversight, there is no federal 
agency mandated to collect information related to local law 
enforcement use of SWAT. The Bureau of Justice Statistics 
(BJS), housed within the Department of Justice’s Office 
of Justice Programs, collects and publishes information 
pertaining to state prison systems, court administration, 
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protect against, respond to, and recover from potential 
terrorist acts and other hazards,”91 but as discussed above, 
this money was often spent on ordinary law enforcement 
activities. Oklahoma Senator Tom Coburn conducted 
an investigation into DHS funding to state and local law 
enforcement agencies in 2012. Senator Coburn concluded, 
on the basis of information contained in DHS reports, 
briefings with the DHS Office of the Inspector General, 
and project data and spending plans from 29 urban areas, 
that “taxpayer money spent on homeland security grant 
programs has not always been spent in ways obviously 
linked to terrorism or preparedness” and that “[DHS] has 
done very little oversight of the program, allowing cities to 
spend the money on almost anything they want, as long as 
it has broad ties to terror prevention.”92
There is also minimal oversight over expenditures of DOJ 
funds. The Bureau of Justice Assistance conducts some 
oversight over JAG funds, and has been strengthening 
its oversight in recent months, particularly with regard 
to potential use of JAG funds to subsidize racially biased 
marijuana possession arrests. However, there is virtually no 
oversight over weapons expenditures or use of paramilitary 
tactics in drug investigations.
There does not appear to be much, if any, local oversight 
of law enforcement agency receipt of equipment transfers 
under the 1033 Program or grants from the DHS or DOJ. 
None of the documents the ACLU reviewed relating to 
policies and procedures contained any provisions regarding 
internal oversight of such transfers and grants. The ACLU 
is also not aware of any formal procedures that have been 
imposed at the local level requiring public oversight of 
requests for equipment transfers or grants, though some 
municipalities have held ad hoc hearings when their local 
law enforcement agencies have proposed a transfer or grant 
that may be controversial.93 The public has a right to know 
what weapons and tactics are being used to police it and 
how its tax dollars are being spent.
to LESO, that participating agencies update their account 
information annually, etc.).
There is a biannual Program Compliance Review using 
a checklist.88 The compliance review is not rigorous, 
however, and simply requires the state coordinator to 
certify that appointed personnel are proficient with DLA 
websites, that participating agencies are in fact eligible 
(the sole eligibility requirement is that the agency is a law 
enforcement agency), that the agency has in place proper 
records management and retention processes and inventory 
control, that there is a compliance review process in place, 
that there are steps in place to ensure that 1033 property 
is not sold, whether an agency has sold 1033 property or 
received property for the sole purpose of selling it, and that 
property transferred complies with the MOA.
The state coordinator is also required to state what steps 
are taken to ensure that participating agencies do not 
requisition unnecessary or excessive amounts of property. 
However, the ACLU did not uncover any records pursuant 
to its investigation to suggest that any of the agencies 
studied had a single request for equipment denied by the 
state coordinator during the two years studied.
States or agencies can be suspended for failure to conduct 
a required inventory, but there are no consequences for 
overly aggressive use of equipment.
LESO conducts an annual briefing for law enforcement 
personnel in each state.89 This briefing includes information 
on technical support and training available to agencies via 
the LESO program. One person from each state is required 
to attend. The briefing does not appear to address the 
importance of exercising restraint in the acquisition and use 
of military equipment by local law enforcement agencies.
There appears to be no requirement that the Department 
of Defense make any certification to Congress regarding 
the performance or impact of the program.
There is virtually no oversight over DHS support to state 
and local law enforcement through the Homeland Security 
Grant Program.90 In 2013, DHS distributed nearly a 
billion dollars to state and local law enforcement agencies 
through the HSGP to “enhance the ability of states, 
territories, and Federally recognized tribes to prevent, 
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Further, often the quantity of drugs found did not seem to 
justify a SWAT deployment. For example, the Allentown 
SWAT team was deployed to search someone’s house for 
drugs. They executed the warrant at 6:00 a.m., knowing 
children were likely to be present. When gathering 
intelligence the day before, the team did not see any 
weapons. Nonetheless, the team deployed a distraction 
device, broke the door down with a battering ram, and 
entered the residence to find three adults and three children 
asleep in the home. The team found no weapons and what 
the report described as a “small amount of marijuana.” 
This finding supports Kraska’s earlier research. Kraska 
found, based on his survey data, that 80 percent of 
deployments during the time period he studied were for 
the purpose of executing a search warrant, not to deal with 
situations for which SWAT teams  were created, such as 
hostage, sniper, or terrorist situations.94 He concluded on 
the basis of his research that “[SWAT teams have] changed 
The Purpose of SWAT
FINDING #3
SWAT teams were often deployed—
unnecessarily and aggressively—to 
execute search warrants in low-level 
drug investigations; deployments 
for hostage or barricade scenarios 
occurred in only a small number of 
incidents.
Use of SWAT to Search for Drugs
Even though paramilitary policing in the form of SWAT 
teams was created to deal with emergency scenarios such 
as hostage or barricade situations, the use of SWAT to 
execute search warrants in drug investigations has become 
commonplace and made up the majority of incidents 
the ACLU reviewed. When the police are executing a 
search warrant, there has been no formal accusation of 
a crime; rather, the police are simply acting on the basis 
of probable cause to believe that drugs will be present. 
There is no criminal case, no formal suspects, and often 
little if any proof that a crime has been committed; it is 
simply an investigation. Thus, the use of a SWAT team 
to execute a search warrant essentially amounts to the 
use of paramilitary tactics to conduct domestic drug 
investigations in people’s homes. 
The majority (79 percent) of SWAT deployments the 
ACLU studied were for the purpose of executing a 
search warrant, most commonly in drug investigations. 
Only a small handful of deployments (7 percent) were 
for hostage, barricade, or active shooter scenarios. The 
remaining deployments were for other purposes such as 
protecting visiting dignitaries, capturing fleeing suspects, 
and responding to emergencies. Our investigation found 
that in the majority of deployments the police did not face 
genuine threats to their safety and security.
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to distinguish between weapons that were lawfully owned 
versus those that a suspect was thought to possess illegally.
In nearly every deployment involving a barricade, hostage, 
or active shooter, the SWAT report provided specific facts 
that gave the SWAT team reason to believe there was an 
armed and often dangerous suspect. For example, the 
Concord, North Carolina, SWAT team was called out to a 
barricade situation involving a man who had barricaded 
himself in his home, was making explosives, and was 
considered mentally unstable. All of this information was 
provided to police by a member of the man’s family. The 
man had previously been arrested for making bombs and 
was known by family members to possess a large number 
of firearms. The team safely took the man into custody and 
seized at least four firearms, large amounts of ammunition, 
several axes and hatches, and bomb-making materials that 
had to be detonated by the bomb squad. 
In contrast, incident reports for search warrant executions, 
especially in drug investigations, often contained no 
information about why the SWAT team was being sent in, 
other than to note that the warrant was “high risk,” or else 
provided otherwise unsubstantiated information such as 
“suspect is believed to be armed.” In case after case that 
the ACLU examined, when a SWAT team was deployed to 
search a person’s home for drugs, officers determined that 
a person was “likely to be armed” on the basis of suspected 
but unfounded gang affiliations, past weapons convictions, 
or some other factor that did not truly indicate a basis 
for believing that the person in question was likely to be 
armed at the moment of the SWAT deployment. Of course, 
a reasonable belief that weapons are present should not 
by itself justify a SWAT deployment. Given that almost 
half of American households have guns, use of a SWAT 
team could almost always be justified if this were the sole 
factor.96 However, because the use of SWAT increases the 
likelihood that the occupants will use weapons to defend 
themselves, which increases the risk of violence and thus of 
harm to both law enforcement and civilians, presence of a 
weapon alone should not automatically result in a SWAT 
deployment.
Some agencies have checklists or matrices that they employ 
to determine whether a situation is “high risk.” In using 
these lists, officers check off various risk factors that 
from being a periphery and strictly reactive component of 
police departments to a proactive force actively engaged in 
fighting the drug war.”95 Based on our statistical analysis, 
we agree with this conclusion.
Lack of Standards
Most police departments have in place standards that allow 
for SWAT deployment in cases involving hostage, barricade, 
active shooter, or other emergency scenarios, or in “high-
risk” warrant scenarios. But what constitutes a “high-risk” 
scenario depends largely on the subjective beliefs of the 
officers involved. This lack of clear and legitimate standards 
for deploying SWAT may result in the excessive and 
unnecessary use of SWAT deployments in drug cases.
One reason for thinking that serving a warrant may be 
“high risk” would be the presence of a person who is 
armed and dangerous. More often than not, we found that 
SWAT records contained no information to explain why 
the officers believed a particular scenario was “high risk.” 
Even in incidents in which the police believe an armed 
person would be present, very often there was insufficient 
information to know what formed the officer’s belief; 
often, the SWAT team was called out based on an officer’s 
subjective belief that a person involved was “known to 
carry weapons” or “had been found to carry weapons in the 
past.” SWAT officers seemed to make no effort whatsoever 
More often than not, we found 
that SWAT records contained 
no information to explain 
why the officers believed a 
particular scenario was  
“high risk.”
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response, including perhaps fewer officers and less military 
weaponry.
Accuracy of Assessing Threats 
One way to evaluate the reliability of a SWAT officer’s 
unsubstantiated beliefs concerning the threat danger and 
likely presence of weapons is to measure the likelihood that 
an officer’s subjective belief in the presence of weapons 
resulted in the SWAT team actually finding weapons at the 
scene. We found in the course of our investigation that the 
SWAT team found weapons (the overwhelming majority of 
which were firearms such as handguns, but rarely assault 
rifles) in just over one-third of the incidents in which they 
predicted finding them, which suggests the police are not 
particularly good at accurately forecasting the presence of 
weapons. Furthermore, if SWAT were being used for the 
limited purposes for which it was created, we would expect 
them to find weapons in nearly all of the incidents studied.
TABLE 1
Weapons Predicted v Weapons Found
Weapons Located
Weapons Believed 
To Be Present
Yes No Unknown
Yes 35% 32% 33%
No 13% 43% 44%
No-knock warrants were used (or probably used) in about 
60 percent of the incidents in which SWAT teams were 
searching for drugs, even though many resulted in the 
SWAT team finding no drugs or small quantities of drugs. 
For example, the Burlington County, North Carolina, 
SWAT team was deployed to search for drugs in a person’s 
home. Upon executing the warrant, all that was found 
was drug paraphernalia (such as a pipe) and a residue 
amount of cocaine (presumably the residue found in the 
pipe). Given that the ostensible purpose of forcing entry 
into a home is to prevent the destruction of “evidence” 
(i.e., the presumed purpose of the no-knock being issued 
in this case), this result is troubling. One would expect to 
they believe to be present and, presumably on the basis 
of the risk factors present, calculate a risk score. SWAT 
deployment is considered (and sometimes mandated) on 
the basis of whether the risk level meets a predetermined 
threshold. Unfortunately, though, having such mechanisms 
in place does not obviate the problem of unnecessarily 
aggressive SWAT deployments because using an internal 
checklist or matrix does not eliminate subjectivity. In 
one case, the officer completing the threat matrix, and 
perhaps knowing that the woman who was the subject 
of the warrant had no serious criminal history, included 
the histories of other people (not even confined to other 
people at the residence) in calculating the threat score. This 
elevated the score to the level needed to justify a SWAT 
deployment. In addition, whether a person is likely to be 
armed is often considered a risk factor, but as discussed 
above, making that determination is highly subjective. 
Some of the threat matrices examined in connection 
with this investigation contained factors and counting 
procedures that were themselves problematic. For example, 
the Concord, North Carolina, threat matrix considers 
“religious extremist” to be a risk factor. In addition to 
possibly violating the First Amendment,97 predicting risk 
on the basis of religious ideology is ineffective for two 
reasons: (1) there is no simple link between the adoption 
of an ideology and violent action; and (2) it is exceedingly 
difficult to craft a coherent model of the kinds of ideologies 
or beliefs that could be expected to lead to violence.98 
Other jurisdictions that use a matrix often consider the 
fact that the deployment is part of a drug investigation 
as having a high point value, but simply having drugs in 
one’s home should not be considered a high-risk factor 
justifying a paramilitary search. Without consistency, 
clarity, meaningful metrics, and the use of appropriate risk 
factors, these matrices seem to cause more problems than 
they resolve. 
In addition, the ACLU did not uncover any policies or 
practices encouraging partial responses. It appeared 
that deployments almost always involved a complete 
deployment, including numerous officers armed with 
assault rifles, battering rams, and distraction devices. 
Many deployments—to the extent they were justified at 
all—would seem to have warranted a much less aggressive 
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the neighboring agency without a warrant being issued, 
and said that if a warrant were produced, he would then 
consider the request. The officer called his superior and 
apprised him of the situation, and the superior concurred 
with the decision to hold off. The chief of police eventually 
got involved, and he also concurred with the decision to 
hold off. Eventually a warrant was secured. On the basis of 
the warrant, and with the knowledge that a woman was in 
the residence, possibly being held against her will, the team 
decided to deploy. This demonstrates a hesitation to engage 
in activity that was possibly unconstitutional, restraint in 
the use of SWAT, insistence on following proper procedure, 
and professionalism in keeping superiors apprised of the 
situation. 
Another example demonstrating restraint in the use of 
SWAT occurred in Hialeah, Florida, in July 2013. A man 
had set his apartment on fire, killed six building residents, 
and taken another two residents hostage. The chief of 
police tried to negotiate with the man for several hours 
before eventually calling in the SWAT team. He later told 
reporters that “[i]t was a very difficult decision because 
I not only have [sic] the lives of the two hostages that we 
want to rescue, but I have in my hands the lives of the six 
police officers that I’m sending in to confront this man.”99 
The hostages survived, though the man did not. Exercising 
restraint in deploying a SWAT team honors individual 
liberties and maximizes public safety. If restraint was 
warranted in this case, it is difficult to justify the routine 
deployment of SWAT teams to serve search warrants in 
drug investigations in which no clear threat is presented.
If paramilitary tactics were limited to scenarios like these, 
there would be much less cause for concern. Unfortunately, 
these instances are the exception, not the norm.
see a much higher rate of SWAT deployments resulting in 
the seizure of large amounts of drugs. Of course, as with 
the presence of weapons, the mere fact that there might 
be drug evidence that residents could, in theory, attempt 
to destroy upon the police knocking and announcing 
themselves, should not justify the use of militaristic SWAT 
teams forcing themselves into homes as if they are sweeping 
enemy territory in a war zone.
TABLE 2 
Drugs Predicted v Drugs Found
Contraband Located
SWAT Deployed for  
a Drug Offense
Yes No Unknown
Yes 35% 36% 29%
No 11% 27% 62%
Of the cases we studied, in 36 percent of SWAT 
deployments for drug searches, and possibly in as many 
as 65 percent of such deployments, no contraband of 
any sort was found. When also considering that the mere 
presence of contraband should not be enough, by itself, to 
justify SWAT, this seems to suggest strongly that SWAT is 
overused.
Some Appropriate Uses of SWAT
The ACLU came across some incidents during the course 
of the investigation that appeared on the face of the 
records to demonstrate appropriate use of, and restraint 
in deploying, SWAT. In one such incident, an officer was 
asked by a neighboring agency to deploy a SWAT team. 
The officer went to the scene to investigate, and what he 
saw concerned him. In his report, he noted that officers 
from other agencies were involved in breaking down 
all the doors and windows of a person’s residence. He 
asked if there was a warrant and was told there was none. 
When requested to deploy tear gas, he responded that his 
team does not simply deploy gas but rather conducts a 
careful evaluation to ensure that if gas is deployed, proper 
procedures are followed. The officer declined to assist 
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Where race was known, deployments that impacted 
people of color (the majority being Black) constituted 28 
percent of the total, whereas deployments that impacted 
white people constituted 31 percent of the total. A small 
percentage (6 percent) impacted a mix of white people and 
people of color.
Breaking this down further into actual numbers of people 
impacted by SWAT deployments shows that of all the 
incidents studied where the number and race of the people 
impacted were known, 39 percent were Black, 11 percent 
were Latino, 20 were white, and race was unknown for the 
rest of the people impacted. This means that even though 
there were more deployments that impacted only white 
people or a mix of white people and minorities, many 
more people of color were impacted. This may relate to the 
fact that white people were more likely to be impacted by 
deployments involving hostage, barricade, or active shooter 
scenarios, which most often involve domestic disputes 
impacting small numbers of people, whereas people of 
color were more likely to be impacted by deployments 
involving drug investigations, which often impact large 
groups of people and families.
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Of the deployments in which race was known, there was 
a significant racial difference in whether the deployment 
was conducted in a drug case.102 Of the deployments that 
impacted minorities (Black and Latino), 68 percent were 
for drug searches, whereas of deployments that impacted 
white people, only 38 percent were for drug searches. Of 
the deployments that impacted a mix of white people and 
minorities, 73 percent were for drug investigations.
Race and SWAT
FINDING #4
The use of paramilitary weapons and 
tactics primarily impacted people of 
color; when paramilitary tactics were 
used in drug searches, the primary 
targets were people of color, whereas 
when paramilitary tactics were used 
in hostage or barricade scenarios, the 
primary targets were white.
Race, SWAT, and Drugs
It is widely known that policing tactics across the country 
often unfairly target communities of color—the recent 
controversies surrounding stop-and-frisk programs 
in numerous cities across the country document the 
ineffective and unfair racial disparities associated with the 
practice.100 According to the incident reports studied in the 
course of this investigation, the use of paramilitary tactics 
appears to be no different.
Unfortunately, many of the SWAT teams we looked 
at either do not record race information or record it 
unsystematically (in more than one-third of the incidents 
studied, the race of the people impacted was not clear 
from the incident report).101 According to the records that 
did contain race information, SWAT team deployment 
primarily impacted people of color. 
In looking at race data, we examined two variables: the race 
of the people impacted by each deployment and the race of 
the overall number of people impacted by SWAT raids in 
a given area during the studied time period. So the unit of 
measurement in the data presented in this section is either 
“number of deployments impacting people of a certain 
race” or “race of individual people impacted.”
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people impacted were a mix of white people and minorities, 
the deployment was for the purpose of executing a search 
warrant in 84 percent of cases. In contrast, when all of the 
people impacted were white, the purpose was to execute a 
search warrant in 65 percent of cases. 
When the number of people impacted by a deployment 
was known, 42 percent of people impacted by a SWAT 
deployment to execute a search warrant were Black 
and 12 percent were Latino. So overall, of the people 
impacted by deployments for warrants, 54 percent were 
minorities. In contrast, nearly half of the people impacted 
by deployments involving hostage, barricade, or active 
shooter scenarios were white, whereas only 22 percent were 
minorities (the rest were people who were known to have 
been impacted by hostage, barricade, or active shooter 
scenarios but whose race was not known, so the difference 
could be even greater).
In addition, when the data was examined by agency (and 
with local population taken into consideration), racial 
disparities in SWAT deployments were extreme. As shown 
in the table and graph below, in every agency, Blacks were 
disproportionately more likely to be impacted by a SWAT 
raid than whites, sometimes substantially so. For example, 
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Sixty-one percent of all the people impacted by SWAT raids 
in drug cases were minorities.
Racial Differences in Use of SWAT for 
Search Warrants
The numbers become even more troubling when 
examining the racial breakdowns for search warrants. Of 
the deployments in which all of the people impacted were 
minorities, the deployment was for the purpose of executing 
a search warrant in 80 percent of cases, and where the 
SWAT Impact Rates per 100,000
Law Enforcement Agency White Latino Black Times More Likely 
Latinos Impacted
Times More Likely 
Blacks Impacted
Allentown, PA, Police 12 348 281 29.09 23.51
Bay County, FL, Sheriff 6 0 39 0.00 6.56
Burlington, NC, Police 9 0 414 0.00 47.05
Caldwell County, NC, Sheriff 54 0 215 0.00 4.01
Chatham County, NC, Sheriff 74 0 1,146 0.00 15.51
Concord, NC, Police 44 92 485 2.09 11.06
Fort Worth, TX, Police 12 11 154 0.90 12.86
Gwinnett County, CA, Sheriff 1 1 7 0.53 5.49
Huntington, WV, Police 11 0 415 0.00 37.12
Little Rock, AR, Police 3 26 40 9.29 14.13
North Little Rock, AR, Police 6 0 200 0.00 34.54
Ogden, UT, Police 8 85 300 11.16 39.55
Salt Lake City, UT, Police 5 25 36 4.93 7.33
Spokane County, WA, Sheriff 57 14 588 0.25 10.35
Unified, UT, Police 3 13 26 5.18 10.26
Wilson County, NC, Sheriff 16 0 98 0.00 6.02
TABLE 3 
SWAT Impact Rates by Agency (2011–2012)
Source: Data provided by local law enforcement agencies for ACLU investigation.
NOTE: Agencies that do not record data on race/ethnicity are excluded.
37War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing
Use of Violent Tactics 
and Equipment
FINDING #5
SWAT deployments often and 
unnecessarily entailed the use 
of violent tactics and equipment, 
including APCs; use of violent tactics 
and equipment was shown to increase 
the risk of bodily harm and property 
damage.
Use of Violent Tactics to Force Entry
Of the incidents studied in which SWAT was deployed to 
search for drugs in a person’s home, the SWAT teams either 
forced (or probably forced) entry into a person’s home 
using a battering ram or other breaching device 65 percent 
of the time. This means that for drug investigations, 
the SWAT teams studied were almost twice as likely to 
force entry into a person’s home than not, and they were 
more than twice as likely to use forced entry in drug 
investigations than in other cases.
Forcing entry into a person’s home did not necessarily 
result in the discovery of weapons, drugs, or other 
contraband. Drugs or other contraband were either found 
or probably found in only a quarter of the deployments 
in which the SWAT team forced entry. In 54 percent of 
deployments in which the SWAT team forced entry into 
a person’s home using a battering ram or other breaching 
device, the SWAT team either did not or probably did 
not find any weapons. For example, the New Haven, 
Connecticut, SWAT team deployed at 11:00 p.m. to execute 
a search warrant. The team broke down the front door, 
deployed a distraction device, and detained two people 
inside the home, but it did not find any weapons or 
contraband. Given the relatively small amount of drugs and 
in Allentown, Pennsylvania, Blacks were nearly 24 times 
more likely to be impacted by a SWAT raid than whites 
were, and in Huntington, West Virginia, Blacks were 37 
times more likely. Further, in Ogden, Utah, Blacks were 
40 times more likely to be impacted by a SWAT raid than 
whites were.  
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It is well established that the War on Drugs has been waged 
primarily and unfairly on people of color—from being 
disproportionately targeted for low-level drug arrests to 
serving longer prison sentences for the same drug crimes. 
Our findings add the unfair and disproportionate use of 
paramilitary home raids to this shameful list of racially 
biased drug enforcement.
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routinely but do not record that fact). Still others (e.g., Bay 
County, Florida) seem to make selective use of APCs. In 
addition, some agencies used APCs that go by other names, 
and it is not always possible to know whether an APC is 
being referenced in an incident report.
From our review of the incident reports and discussions 
with members of law enforcement, we conclude that the 
use of BearCats or other APCs was rarely necessary for the 
types of deployments in which they were used based on two 
observations: (1) the numerous incidents in which an APC 
was deployed but not used for any obvious purpose; and (2) 
the numerous incidents in which the SWAT team was able to 
accomplish its objective without the use of an APC.
There were numerous incidents in which a BearCat was 
deployed but not put to any obvious use during the 
course of the deployment. For example, SWAT officers 
in Allentown, Pennsylvania, were deployed to search 
someone’s home for drugs. They deployed at 6:45 a.m., 
with both a BearCat and an emergency van, knowing that 
a toddler was likely to be present. They broke down the 
door, entered the home, and handcuffed one man, while 
a woman tried to comfort her child, who was presumably 
upset by the commotion. There is no indication that 
the officers made any use of the BearCat, other than for 
transport. The ACLU uncovered numerous incidents such 
as this, when there was some attendant danger, perhaps, 
but this does not justify using an armored military vehicle 
directly in front of someone’s home in the middle of a 
residential neighborhood. 
There were several incidents in which a SWAT team 
was able to accomplish its objective without use of an 
APC.103 For example, in the Concord, North Carolina, 
case described above involving a man who had barricaded 
himself, suffered from mental illness, and was suspected 
of making bombs, the SWAT team was able to convince 
the man to surrender, and there was no indication on the 
face of the document that a BearCat was used. In another 
incident, the Allentown SWAT team was called out to 
deal with an armed robbery investigation. No BearCat 
was deployed, and the suspects surrendered without 
incident. SWAT teams consist of heavily armed, highly 
professional tactical officers trained to handle extremely 
high-risk scenarios. Such officers have proven themselves 
weapons found during the course of these deployments, it 
is difficult to justify the forcible entry into private homes.
The SWAT teams studied were much more likely to force 
entry in drug search cases than in other scenarios. When 
SWAT was deployed to search a home for drugs, the squad 
forced entry in more than 60 percent of incidents. In 
contrast, when SWAT was deployed for a reason other than 
searching a home for drugs, the squad forced entry in fewer 
than 40 percent of cases.
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Very little information was discernable regarding the use of 
flashbang grenades, but in the cases in which information 
was available, we discovered that of the incidents in which 
SWAT teams were searching people’s homes for drugs, 
they were 14 times more likely to use a flashbang grenade, 
and they were three times more likely to use a flashbang 
grenade in drug investigations than in other cases. 
Use of Armored Personnel Carriers During 
SWAT Raids
It was nearly impossible to track the use of BearCats and 
other APCs by SWAT teams. On the face of the documents 
examined, some law enforcement agencies (e.g., New 
Haven, Connecticut; Allentown, Pennsylvania; Unified 
Police Department, Utah) appear to deploy a BearCat 
almost routinely. Others (e.g., Gwinnett County, Georgia) 
do not appear to use an APC at all, though it is not clear 
whether that is because they do not have one or because 
they have one but do not use it (or even whether they use it 
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It is not unusual for people to mistake a SWAT 
deployment in the middle of the night for an armed 
burglary, and both civilians and police have been 
killed in resulting shootouts.
to suffer from paranoid schizophrenia, after already forcing 
entry through multiple other sites and shattering a sliding 
glass door. 
Consequences of Using Violent Tactics
Using aggressive tactics in drug raids can have disastrous 
consequences. In the deployments the ACLU examined, 
seven civilian deaths occurred in connection with 
deployment, two of which appeared to be the result of 
suicide (in at least one of these cases, the suspect stated 
that he was willing to come outside but then shot himself 
upon learning that the SWAT team was waiting for him). In 
the incidents we examined, 46 civilians were injured in the 
course of a deployment, often as the result of a use of force 
by a member of the SWAT team.104 
Examples of the tragic results of SWAT officer-involved 
shootings are widely available. For example, earlier this 
year, the Albuquerque Police Department sent a heavily 
armed unit to confront James Boyd, a homeless man 
who was “camping illegally” in the Sandia Foothills. The 
encounter ended with officers shooting and killing him. 
Though it did not involve the search of a home, this 
example fits the militarization pattern for a number of 
reasons. First, the police approached Boyd in full SWAT 
gear simply because he was illegally camping in an Open 
Space area in the foothills outside of Albuquerque. Second, 
the officers purposefully escalated the conflict to the point 
where the use of lethal force was inevitable. The action that 
set it all off was the deployment of a flashbang grenade. 
Finally, the weapon that killed Boyd appears to have been 
an assault rifle or some other high-powered weapon 
(ironically, the SWAT officers fired live ammunition 
alongside beanbag rounds). Again, this demonstrates the 
alarming tendency of paramilitary policing to escalate, 
rather than ameliorate, the risk of violence.105
Although no SWAT officers were killed in any of the 
deployments that the ACLU examined, deaths to officers 
have indeed resulted from the use of paramilitary policing 
tactics. Take the case of Henry McGee, who was asleep 
with his pregnant girlfriend when the police forced their 
way into his home at dawn to look for a marijuana grow 
to be effective when they are deployed to handle high-risk 
situations without the use of an APC.
While officer safety is sometimes a concern during the 
execution of a search warrant in which SWAT is deployed, 
it is not a concern in all such deployments. Importantly, 
there are effective alternatives to use of APCs, such as 
making ordinary police vehicles built for domestic law 
enforcement (as opposed to combat), bullet-proof.
Use of an APC can also endanger, not protect, both 
officers and civilians, and can increase the risk of property 
damage. In one case we examined, the SWAT team was 
deployed to handle a dangerous barricade scenario in 
which officers knew that a man was armed with a firearm. 
The team deployed with a BearCat. At one point, the man 
disappeared from view and exited the home through the 
garage; he started walking toward officers who were not 
aware of his presence because they were watching the front 
door. The officers should have been able to provide cover, 
but the BearCat literally obstructed their view of the garage. 
Eventually the man surrendered, but the situation could 
have had tragic results. 
Use of a BearCat or other APC can also increase the risk of 
property damage. In one case, a SWAT team used a BearCat 
to break down a front gate. In another, a SWAT team used 
a BearCat to break through the front door of a man known 
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when children were probably not present and counted the 
remaining incidents as unknown. Using this methodology, 
we determined that of the 818 deployments studied, 14 
percent involved the presence of children and 13 percent 
did not. Thirty-eight percent probably did not involve the 
presence of children and 35 percent were unknown. This 
evaluation is necessarily unscientific because the reports 
provided simply did not provide enough information 
to draw a conclusion about the presence of children. In 
addition, SWAT teams should be more deliberate and 
precise in documenting the presence of children in order to 
avoid subjecting children to SWAT deployments whenever 
possible.
operation. Believing his home was being burglarized, 
McGee drew a firearm and shot and killed an officer. He 
was initially charged with capital murder, but the grand 
jury refused to indict him. Investigators found a few 
marijuana plants in the home.106 Thus, although some 
police officers often argue that excessively militarized 
weapons and tactics are needed to prevent violence, these 
wartime tools and tactics often have the opposite effect of 
escalating the risk of violence.
Use of Violent Tactics With Children Present
During the course of this investigation, we noted another 
troubling trend: the deployment of SWAT when children 
were present or without sufficient intelligence to know 
whether children would be present. As documented 
above, a SWAT deployment can involve significant levels 
of violence, including breaking down doors, shattering 
windows, and the detonation of explosive devices. In 
addition, SWAT officers also typically deploy wearing 
“BDUs” (battle dress uniforms), carry large semi-automatic 
rifles, which they sometimes point at people during 
deployment, and often use force, throwing people onto the 
floor and handcuffing them. Experiencing violent events 
can have serious and long-term impacts, particularly on 
children.107 
Determining the number of SWAT deployments in which 
children were present was challenging because many 
reports did not indicate whether children were present. 
While some agencies specifically documented the presence 
and number of children through use of a check box or 
other data collection mechanism, others mentioned the 
presence of children only in passing, in the narrative 
portion of the report. In reviewing the documents, we 
noted when the presence (and, where possible, the number) 
of children was documented. We also drew inferences 
about incidents in which children were almost certainly 
not present (for example, reports involving hostage-taking 
related to domestic violence were almost always careful 
to note the presence of children, such that we inferred 
the absence of children when a report of a domestic 
hostage-taking did not mention them). In the rest of the 
cases, we made what inferences we could to determine 
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SWAT teams should never be deployed based solely on 
probable cause to believe drugs are present, even if they 
have a warrant to search a home. In addition, SWAT teams 
should not equate the suspected presence of drugs with a 
threat of violence. SWAT deployment for warrant service 
is appropriate only if the police can demonstrate, before 
deployment, that ordinary law enforcement officers cannot 
safely execute a warrant without facing an imminent threat 
of serious bodily harm. In making these determinations it 
is important to take into consideration the fact that use of 
a SWAT team can escalate rather than ameliorate potential 
violence; law enforcement should take appropriate 
precautions to avoid the use of SWAT whenever possible. 
In addition, all SWAT deployments, regardless of the 
underlying purpose, should be proportional—not all 
situations call for a SWAT deployment consisting of 20 
heavily armed officers in an APC, and partial deployments 
should be encouraged when appropriate.
Local police departments should develop their own internal 
policies calling for restraint and should avoid all training 
programs that encourage a “warrior” mindset.
Finally, the public has a right to know how the police are 
spending its tax dollars. The militarization of American 
policing has occurred with almost no oversight, and greater 
documentation, transparency, and accountability are 
urgently needed.
A requirement that SWAT officers wear body cameras would 
create a public record of SWAT deployments and serve as 
a check against unnecessarily aggressive tactics. The ACLU 
generally takes a dim view of the proliferation of surveillance 
cameras in American life, but body cameras are different 
because of their potential to serve as a check on police 
overreach. Any policy requiring SWAT officers to wear body 
cameras should have in place rigorous safeguards regarding 
data retention, use, access, and disclosure.108
To further advance these principles, the ACLU makes the 
following specific recommendations.
The militarization of policing is one example of how contemporary policing in America is failing 
to deliver on its primary objective of protecting and 
serving communities. The culture of policing in America 
needs to evolve beyond the failed War on Drugs, and the 
police should stop perceiving the people who live in the 
communities they patrol—including those the police 
suspect of criminal activity—as enemies. 
This type of reform must be achieved systemically and 
include a transformation in police culture; the problems of 
overly aggressive policing cannot be solved by disciplining 
a few officers or dismissing the problem as a few isolated 
incidents. These recommendations are aimed at ensuring 
that law enforcement responses minimize harm to civilians 
and property and maximize as oppose to jeopardize the 
safety of everyone involved.  
The federal government should take the lead by reining 
in programs that incentivize local police to engage in 
excessively militarized tactics, especially in drug cases. The 
federal government holds the purse strings, and restricting 
the flow of federal funds and military-grade equipment 
into states and localities, and/or conditioning funds on 
the appropriate use and training with regards to such 
equipment, would significantly reduce the overuse of 
hyper-aggressive tactics and military-grade tools in local 
communities.  
Additionally, state legislatures and municipalities should 
impose meaningful restraints on the use of SWAT. SWAT 
deployments should be limited to the kinds of scenarios for 
which these aggressive measures were originally intended 
– barricade, hostage, and active shooter situations. Rather 
than allowing for a SWAT deployment in any case that 
is deemed (for whatever reason the officers determine) 
to be “high risk,” the better practice would be for law 
enforcement agencies to have in place clear standards 
limiting SWAT deployments to scenarios that are truly 
“high risk.” 
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encountered during the deployment, whether as a 
suspect or bystander; whether any civilians, officers, 
or domestic animals sustained any injury or death; 
and a list of any controlled substances, weapons, 
contraband, or evidence of crime found on the 
premises or any individuals.
■■ States should ensure that there is an agency 
responsible for overseeing and monitoring SWAT 
activity, and for implementing necessary reforms, 
including developing a process for addressing 
civilian complaints regarding SWAT tactics.
To City and County Governments and Law 
Enforcement Agencies
4.	 As an immediate step, law enforcement agencies should 
adopt internal deployment standards as a matter of 
local policy. Tactical deployments should be limited 
to scenarios in which there is a likelihood that the 
situation for which the SWAT team is being deployed 
presents an imminent threat to the lives of civilians 
and/or police personnel. When SWAT is deployed 
for warrant service, the basis for believing such a 
likelihood exists should have to be established explicitly 
and approved by a supervisor or other high-ranking 
official before the deployment.
5.	 Law enforcement agencies should adopt local policies 
requiring the implementation of the following best 
practices in the use of SWAT teams:
■■ Each deployment should be pre-approved by a 
supervisor or other high-ranking official.
■■ Each deployment should be preceded by a written 
planning process that documents the specific need 
for the deployment, describes how the operation 
is to be conducted, and states whether children, 
pregnant women, and/or elderly people are likely to 
be present (except in emergency scenarios in which 
engaging in such a process would endanger the lives 
or well-being of civilians or police personnel).
■■ All SWAT deployments should include a trained 
crisis negotiator.
To State Governments
1.	 States should enact laws encouraging the restrained 
and appropriate use of SWAT teams and similar 
tactical teams. Tactical deployments should be limited 
to scenarios in which there is a likelihood that the 
situation for which the SWAT team is being deployed 
presents an imminent threat to the lives of civilians 
and/or police personnel. When SWAT is deployed 
for warrant service, the basis for believing such a 
likelihood exists should have to be established explicitly 
and approved by a supervisor or other high-ranking 
official before the deployment.
2.	 States should remedy the problem created by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hudson v. Michigan by 
enacting laws requiring that evidence obtained in 
violation of the traditional rule that requires that the 
police knock and announce their presence should be 
excluded from any subsequent legal proceedings.
3.	 States should enact laws requiring transparency and 
oversight of state and local law enforcement use of 
SWAT teams.
■■ States should require local law enforcement 
agencies that maintain a SWAT team to use a 
standardized form to record specific data related to 
SWAT deployments. These forms should be used to 
generate quarterly reports.
■■ States should require every state or local law 
enforcement agency that maintains a SWAT team 
to submit a quarterly report to the legislature that 
contains the number of times the SWAT team was 
activated or deployed, as well as the following for 
each activation/deployment: the address of the 
location of activation/deployment; the reason for 
each activation/deployment; the specific factors 
establishing compliance with the applicable 
deployment standard; whether forcible entry or 
a breach was conducted and, if so, the equipment 
used in forcing the entry or conducting the breach 
and for what purpose; whether a distraction device 
was used and, if so, what type and for what purpose; 
whether an APC was used and, if so, for what 
purpose; the race, sex, and age of each individual 
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■■ SWAT officers should wear “on-officer recording 
systems” (so-called “body cameras”) during 
deployments, and police departments should have 
in place rigorous safeguards regarding the retention, 
use, access, and disclosure of data captured by such 
systems.
■■ All deployments should be proportional to the 
need; a full deployment consisting of numerous 
heavily armed officers in an APC is often excessive. 
Many scenarios do not necessitate the use of 
a SWAT team at all, and partial deployments 
involving the minimal amount of military 
equipment necessary should be encouraged.
■■ For each SWAT deployment, a post-deployment 
record should be made that documents the 
following, in a manner that allows for the data to be 
easily compiled and analyzed: 
The purpose of the deployment
The specific reason for believing that the 
situation for which the SWAT team was being 
deployed presented an imminent threat to 
the lives or safety of civilians and/or police 
personnel. 
Whether forcible entry or a breach was 
conducted and, if so, the equipment used and 
for what purpose 
Whether a distraction device was used and, if so, 
what type and for what purpose 
Whether an APC was used and, if so, for what 
purpose 
The race, sex, and age of each individual 
encountered during the deployment, whether as 
a suspect or bystander 
Whether any civilians, officers, or domestic 
animals sustained any injury or death 
A list of any controlled substances, weapons, 
contraband, or evidence of crime that is found 
on the premises or any individuals 
A brief narrative statement describing any 
unusual circumstances or important data 
elements not captured in the list above.
■■ Law enforcement agencies should provide training 
programs for all SWAT teams that do not promote 
an overly aggressive or “warrior” mentality.
6.	 Local and county governments should ensure that 
there is an agency responsible for ensuring that its 
police are not excessively militarized, which could 
include civilian review boards. Such responsibilities 
should include the following:
■■ Approving/disapproving all (a) requests for the 
receipt of weapons and vehicles under the 1033 
Program; (b) requests for grant funding from the 
federal government that will be used to purchase 
military-style weapons and vehicles; and (c) 
proposals to purchase military-style weapons and 
vehicles from vendors
■■ Developing a process for addressing civilian 
complaints regarding SWAT tactics, including a 
system for submitting complaints, conducting 
hearings, and providing for individual remedies 
■■ Making appropriate recommendations for agency-
wide reforms
■■ Considering, on an annual basis, whether continued 
maintenance of a SWAT team is appropriate and, 
if not, to recommending the dissolution of the 
agency’s SWAT team.
To Congress
7.	 Congress should condition state and local law 
enforcement agencies’ receipt of federal funds on 
an agreement not to use the funds to purchase 
automatic or semi-automatic rifles or APCs. This 
condition should be applied to grants made through 
the Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland 
Security Grant Program, the Department of Justice’s 
Byrne JAG grant program, and all other funding 
streams through which money is transferred from 
the federal government to state and law enforcement 
agencies.
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8.	 With respect to the 1033 Program, 10 U.S.C. 2576a(a)
(1), Congress should prohibit the transfer of 
automatic and semi-automatic weapons and APCs; 
remove the words “counter-drug” each time they 
appear in the statute; and require the Secretary of 
Defense to submit to Congress an annual written 
certification that each agency that participates in 
the 1033 Program has provided documentation 
accounting for all equipment transferred to the agency 
and prohibiting additional transfers to any agency for 
which the Secretary cannot provide such certification.
To the Administration
9.	 The Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics 
(BJS) should work with representatives of local law 
enforcement to develop a data collection tool to assess 
the militarization of policing, by monitoring the use 
of SWAT teams as well as the receipt and purchase 
of military weapons and tactics. Once the tool is 
developed, BJS should collect, compile, and analyze 
the available data on the use of military weapons and 
tactics, including SWAT deployments by state and 
local law enforcement agencies annually.  
10.	The Department of Defense should promulgate 
regulations pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2576a(a)(1) 
clarifying that automatic and semi-automatic 
weapons and APCs are not suitable for use by state 
and local law enforcement agencies for the purpose of 
equipment transfers under the 1033 Program.
11.	The Department of Defense should make the 
following changes to the 1033 Program, either by 
promulgating regulations or through the MOA that it 
enters into with local law enforcement agencies:
■■ Require specific, individualized justification to 
receive 1033 equipment 
■■ Impose reasonable limitations on the number 
of weapons and vehicles local law enforcement 
agencies should be entitled to receive under the 
program 
■■ End the requirement that 1033 equipment be used 
within one year 
■■ Require that new applications for equipment 
under the 1033 Program take into account a law 
enforcement agency’s existing inventory 
■■ Require that agencies receiving 1033 equipment 
through interagency transfer comply with the same 
application and reporting requirements as agencies 
that receive 1033 equipment directly from DLA
■■ Develop a clear compliance review process that 
addresses both proper inventory management and 
documentation of each use of 1033 equipment.
12.	The Department of Homeland Security should impose 
meaningful conditions on the receipt of funds to local 
law enforcement agencies. In order to receive funds, 
local law enforcement agencies should have to agree to 
the following:
■■ Not to use the funds to purchase automatic or 
semi-automatic rifles or APCs 
■■ To certify to DHS that agencies receiving funds 
have not in fact used equipment purchased with 
DHS money except in actual high-risk scenarios
■■ To require agencies receiving DHS funds to make 
a record of each equipment purchase made using 
DHS funds, which should be made available to the 
public.
13.	The Department of Justice should improve oversight 
of the Byrne JAG program by providing guidance to 
grantees on the importance of exercising restraint 
when using paramilitary weapons and tactics and 
tracking the race, ethnicity, sex, and age of all people 
impacted by the use of paramilitary weapons and 
tactics purchased using Byrne JAG funds.
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excessive reliance on overly aggressive approaches to 
policing and punishing drug crimes, but there is a danger 
that these federally-funded efforts could be undermined 
by the federal government’s role in subsidizing the use of 
paramilitary weapons and tactics in localities, particularly 
in many communities of color. Without rethinking its 
role in militarizing local police departments, the federal 
government may end up sabotaging the very same reforms 
it is championing.
The use of paramilitary weapons and tactics to conduct 
ordinary law enforcement—especially to wage the failed 
War on Drugs and most aggressively in communities of 
color—has no place in contemporary society. It is not too 
late to change course—through greater transparency, more 
oversight, policies that encourage restraint, and limitations 
on federal incentives, we can foster a policing culture that 
honors its mission to protect and serve, not to wage war.
CONCLUSION
A s public support for the War on Drugs reaches its lowest ever, it is important that we start to not only 
roll back battle plans but encourage law enforcement 
agencies to stop overusing the wartime tools and tactics 
that have fought these battles.
American policing has become excessively militarized 
through the use of weapons and tactics designed for the 
battlefield. Militarization unfairly impacts people of color 
and undermines individual liberties, and it has been 
allowed to happen in the absence of any meaningful public 
discussion.
It is generally accepted that public perception of the 
legitimacy of law enforcement turns on how the police 
treat people when exercising their regulatory authority, and 
people are more likely to obey the law when they perceive 
law enforcement authorities as legitimate.109 There is some 
evidence that people perceive police militarization as 
threatening, which suggests that police militarization itself 
could undermine public safety.110 More research should be 
done on this topic.
There is also a “large and persistent racial gap” in 
confidence in policing.111 Because police militarization 
tends to be concentrated in communities of color, 
it threatens to undermine public confidence more 
dramatically in those communities, where such confidence 
in law enforcement is already strained. More research 
should be done in this area as well.
As previously mentioned, Attorney General Eric H. Holder, 
Jr., has announced broad reforms, including guidelines 
to curtail the use of mandatory minimum sentencing 
laws by federal prosecutors in certain drug cases and a 
$4.75 million project funded by the federal government 
and designed to ease mistrust between local police 
departments and minority communities by collecting 
and studying data on searches, arrests, and case outcomes 
in order to help assess the impact of possible bias. These 
developments have real potential to reduce America’s 
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NAME 
TITLE 
AGENCY 
OFFICE 
ADDRESS 1 
ADDRESS 2 
 
DATE 
 
Re: Public Records Request / SWAT Teams and Cutting-Edge Weapons and 
Technology 
 
To Whom It May Concern: 
 
This letter is a request under the             by the American Civil Liberties Union of          
. This request seeks records regarding your Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams, 
as well as your acquisition and use of cutting-edge technology. 
 
Records Requested 
 
A. Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Teams 
 
Please provide copies of the following created, updated, or edited, records from 
January 1, 2011, to the present: 
 
1. All incident reports or other records documenting each time a SWAT team was 
deployed.  All reports showing breakdowns of SWAT team deployments by 
crime, requesting agency, or purpose for the raid (i.e. to serve a warrant, arrest 
someone, diffuse a hostage crisis, etc.) and all post-deployment documentation, 
including: 
 
a. All documents relating to the number of no-knock warrants applied for, 
and the number of no-knock warrants granted, denied, or modified, in 
conjunction with a SWAT team deployment; 
 
b. All documents relating to uses of force by all SWAT teams and all 
incident reports documenting all injuries incurred by anyone at the scene 
of a SWAT team operation.  
 
2. All procedures, regulations, or guidelines relating to SWAT teams, including the 
protocols and legal standards that must be met before SWAT team deployment. 
 
3. All documents relating to the structure or mission of SWAT teams, including 
chain of command and the selection of team personnel, as well as the ranks, 
salaries, and lengths of service of team personnel. 
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4. All documents or training materials used to instruct SWAT teams in any aspect 
of their operation, including information about any training, including but not 
limited to, with military units and other outside agencies and private contractors, 
when and where training sessions took place, and who conducted them. 
 
5. All records relating to the procurement, maintenance or deployment of SWAT 
team weapons and other equipment, including guns, vehicles, personal protective 
equipment and uniforms, surveillance and reconnaissance equipment, less than 
lethal devices, apparatuses and systems for augmented detainee restraint (also 
known as shock-cuffs), forced entry tools, facial recognition technology, 
Cellebrite or other mobile forensics units,  biometric technology, cell phone 
sniffers, and deep packet sniffers, including how it is stored, and who has access 
to it. 
 
6. All written mutual aid agreements or memoranda of understanding with federal, 
state and local agencies, including any branch of the military and private entities 
concerning SWAT teams. 
 
7. All records relating to funding sources and grants your SWAT team applied for, 
and whether or not the application was successful; and 
 
8. All internal or external audits of SWAT team performance or records of cost 
effectiveness.   
 
B. Cutting Edge Weapons and Technology 
 
Please provide copies of the following created, updated, or edited, records from 
January 1, 2011, to the present: 
 
1. The number of Mobile Forensic Data Extraction devices, GPS tracking devices, 
biometric technology, cell phone sniffers, deep packet sniffers, unmanned aerial 
vehicles (sometimes called “drones”), apparatuses and systems for augmented 
detainee restraint (also known as shock-cuffs), Cellebrite or other mobile 
forensics units, and devices capable of facial or behavioral recognition currently 
owned, leased, or borrowed or proposed for purchase or acquisition by your 
agency and the unit or division of your agency given primary use of each device. 
 
2. All practices, procedures, and trainings governing use of all such devices. 
 
3. All policies relating to the maintenance and retention of information obtained 
through such devices, including but not limited to, policies detailing how records 
of such information are kept, databases in which they are placed, limitations on 
who may access the records and for what purposes, circumstances under which 
they are deleted, and circumstances under which they may be shared with other 
government agencies or nongovernmental entities. 
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4. The legal standard or level of suspicion (e.g. probable cause, reasonable 
suspicion, relevance) the agency requires or proffers prior to using such devices. 
 
5. All applications submitted by your Department for equipment through the 
Department of Defense’s “1033” program1 (either directly to the Department of 
Defense or to your state’s administering agency), including whether the 
application was granted, denied, or granted in part (and if so, how). 
 
6. All “1033” program inventories created and maintained pursuant to the May 22, 
2012, moratorium (see 
https://www.dispositionservices.dla.mil/rtd03/leso/index.shtml). 
 
7. All applications submitted by your Department for funding through the 
Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Security Grant Program or Urban 
Area Security Initiative program (including applications submitted to your state’s 
administering agency), including whether the application was granted, denied, or 
granted in part (and if so, how). 
 
Because this request is on a matter of public concern and because it is made on behalf of 
a non-profit organization, we request a fee waiver.  If, however, such a waiver is denied, 
we will reimburse you for the reasonable cost of copying.  Please inform us in advance if 
the cost will be greater than                  . Please send us documents in electronic form if at 
all possible. 
 
According to                   , a custodian of public records shall comply with a request 
within      days after receipt. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.  Please 
furnish all applicable records to                            . If you have questions, please contact 
me at (phone number/email address).  
 
 
     Sincerely, 
 
      
 
                                                 
1 Section 1033 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 
2576a, permits the Secretary of Defense to transfer excess Department of Defense supplies and equipment 
to state and local law enforcement agencies.         has entered into an agreement with the Defense Logistics 
Agency, which governs the transfer of military property to         for use in civilian policing. 
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Examples of SWAT incident reports and weapons transfers received in connection with the ACLU’s 
investigation
Examples include:
■■ A Concord, North Carolina, threat matrix, showing that a person’s religious views is a factor in 
determining whether SWAT should be deployed in that city
■■ A SWAT incident report from El Paso, Texas, describing a SWAT raid in which the squad used a Bearcat 
APC to break through the door of a man known to suffer from mental illness, after already forcing entry 
through multiple other sites and shattering a sliding glass door, then beat and tased the obviously-
confused man
■■ Documentation of receipt by the Keene, New Hampshire, Police Department of the purchase of a Lenco 
Bearcat APC, using homeland security funds
■■ A SWAT incident report from New Haven, Connecticut, describing a nighttime SWAT raid in which the 
squad arrived at the home in a Bearcat APC, broke down the front door with a battering ram, deployed a 
distraction device inside the home, and detained two people inside a home, but did not report finding any 
weapons or evidence
■■ Documentation of receipt by the North Little Rock, Arkansas, Police Department of two Marcbots (robots 
capable of being armed) and a Mamba tactical vehicle
■■ A training document from the National Tactical Officer’s Association showing that officers are being 
trained to have a soldier mentality
63War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing 
469- 031396 -
64 Appendix C
65War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing 
66 Appendix C
c.�ty of Keene 
Police Department 400 Marlboro Street New Hampshire 03431 
PRESS RELEASE 
Keene Police Department Special Mission Rescue Vehicle Acquisition 
November 20th, 2012 
On Friday, November 16th, 2012, members of the Keene Police Department and the City's Fleet 
Services took possession of the Department's Special Mission Rescue Vehicle from Lenco Industries. 
Len co provided training on the vehicle and its equipment prior to release of the vehicle. 
On that date the vehicle was dropped off with a private contractor to have a police radio installed. 
This is the only additional piece of equipment needed that the vehicle did not come built and equipped 
with. 
Upon completion of the radio installation on Tuesday, November 20th, 2012, the vehicle was driven to 
the Keene Police Department and placed into service. 
Training on the vehicle and its on-board equipment and capabilities will be ongoing. This vehicle was 
purchased through Department of Homeland Security and the New Hampshire Department of Safety -
Grants management unit grant funding upon approval of the City Council. 
Information concerning any incident may be provided anonymously via email on our website 
at: 
.ci .keene .nh. 
045225
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NH Department of Safety- Grants Management Unit 
FY 2010 Homeland Security Grant Application 
Ple�se address all points in sequence. The NH State Strategy is approved to support the 
preparedness, prevention, protection and recovery needs of NH's PRIMARY First 
Responders (see exe ). 
Responses should include all jurisdictions participating in the appLcations. Responses to each 
Section should be labeled; however do not exceed page limits for each Section. Please use the 
standard Times New Roman font, 12 pt. with 1" margins. 
SECTION 1: STRATEGY 
(Maximum of3 pages- use the Jetter for information pertaining to each Key item) 
Describe your problem and solution in three pages or less. This narrative should include the 
following: 
A. The acquisition of a Specialized Mission CBRNE/WMD Rescue VehicJe will help to guard 
against a terrorist or CBRNE/W1v1D incident as the vehicle is capable of deflecting blast 
fragmentation behind a wall of shielding, thereby protecting support and/or rescue personnel. This 
�bility allows specialized personnel to respond to or enter into an area and effectively diffuse or 
render harmless any terrorist or CBRNE/WMD situation thus limiting a potential mass casualty 
incident. 
The vehicle will be equipped with the latest in Radiation Detection and Explosive Gas Detection 
equipment to further enhance the safety and capabilities of the mission personnel. The vehicle will be 
equipped with a radio system that will meet APCO (Association of Public Safety Communications 
Officials) Project 25 specifications, assuring the interoperability between law enforcement and fl.re 
agencies throughout the State of New Hampshire. The system capable of integrating with future 
system designs. 
B. The terrorism threat is far reaching and often unforeseen. Terrorist's goals, regardless of 
affiliation, usually encompass the creation of fear among the public, convincing the public that their 
Government is powerless to stop the terrorists, and get immediate publicity for their cause. Keene 
currently hosts several large public functions to include: an annual Pumpkin Festival, which draws 
upwards of 70,000 patrons to the City, the Clarence DeMar Marathon which has been held for the 
last 33 years and is an official qualifying race for the US Olympic Time trials as well as an official 
qualifying race for the Boston Marathon. This race brings in runners and spectators from all over the 
United States. Keene State College, part of the university system of New Hampshire, is located in the 
downtown area of the City of Keene and brings 6000 students to its environs daily. There are other 
city events that draw large crowds and all are susceptible to terrorist attacks. It is known that the use 
of Radiological Dispersion Devices by terrorists is much more likely than the use of a nuclear device. 
Cheshire County currently does not have a transport vehicle capable of protecting personnel in a 
critical incident or measure such radiation. The closest Specialized Mission Vehicle is well over 1 
hour away and tlus does not include the time it takes to mobilize and prepare the personnel necessary 
to drive it to Cheshire County. 
Highways passing through Keene, Routes 9 and 101, prO\·ide the major east/west corridor for 
trucking from Interstate 91 in Vermont to the Concord, Manchester, Nashua and the seacoast. Many 
of these trucks carry hazardous materiah and arc subject to terrorism, natural disasters and motor 
vehicle accident�. 
045240
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DLA Performance Review Checklist
 
 
 
  Date: Click here to enter a date. 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE OF TENNESSEE 
1033 PROGRAM STATE COORDINATOR 
 SUBJECT:  Program Compliance Review (PCR) Checklist 
  
 I.  LESO will Verify: 
  *1.  Is the State Coordinator appointed, in writing, by the current 
Governor of the State? 
Choose an 
item. 
              1a.  Appointment letter effective date: 7/9/12 
  *2.  Is the State Coordinator appointment letter on-file with the Law 
Enforcement Support Office (LESO)? 
Choose an item. 
  *3.  Has the current State Coordinator signed the current Defense 
Logistics Agency (DLA) Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)? 
Choose an item. 
 
    3a.  MOA date: 12/18/13 
  4.  If applicable, are State Points of Contact (SPOCs) appointed, in 
writing, by the current Governor appointed State Coordinator? 
Choose an item. 
  4a.  Is SPOC appointment letter (s) on-file with the LESO? Choose an item. 
  5.  Has the State Coordinator delegated his/her authority to anyone other 
than a SPOC? 
Choose an item. 
  5a.  Is delegation of authority letter (s) on-file with the LESO? Choose an item. 
Comments: Click here to enter text. 
   
 II.  Website Knowledge: 
  1.  Appointed personnel performing the duties with the State 1033 
Program, are proficient and knowledgeable when utilizing the following 
DLA websites: 
 
  1a.  AMPS Website:  https://amps.dla.mil Choose an item. 
  1b.  RTD Website:  https://business.dla.mil/landing/index.jsp Choose an item. 
  1c.  DLA Disposition Services Website: 
https://www.dispositionservices.dla.mil/index.shtml 
Choose an item. 
  1d.  LESO Website: 
https://www.dispositionservices.dla.mil/rtd03/leso/ 
Choose an item. 
Comments: Click here to enter text. 
   
 III.  Eligibility Requirements:  
  1.  Are Applications for Participation submitted by Law Enforcement 
Agencies (LEA) with arrest and apprehension authority signed by the 
Chief Executive Official (CEO), then forwarded to the State 
Coordinator?   
Choose an item. 
  2.  Does the State Coordinator and/or SPOC (s) verify that the LEA is 
authorized to participate in the 1033 Program? 
Choose an item. 
  3.  Are State Coordinator-approved Applications for Participation 
forwarded to the LESO for approval? 
Choose an item. 
Comments: Click here to enter text. 
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 IV.  Records Management: 
  *1.  Is there a current State Plan of Operation on file for the State? Choose an item. 
  1a.  State Plan of Operation effective date: Click here to 
enter a date. 
  *2.  Does the State Coordinator keep current copy of the State Plan of 
Operation, signed by the LEA CEO in LEA file? 
Choose an item. 
 
  3.  Does each LEA keep current copy of the State Plan of Operation, 
signed by their CEO on file? 
Choose an item. 
 
  4.  Does the State Plan of Operation address the following areas:  
  5a.  Purpose Choose an item. 
  5b.  Authority Choose an item. 
  5c.  Terms and Conditions: 
  -LEA Eligibility Criteria Choose an item. 
  -How to enroll in the 1033 Program Choose an item. 
  -LEA Screener Criteria Choose an item. 
  -Identification/Acquisition of Property Choose an item. 
  -Transportation of Property Choose an item. 
  -Storage of Property Choose an item. 
  -Distribution of Property Choose an item. 
  -Security of Property Choose an item. 
  -Accountability of Property Choose an item. 
  -Establish an Inactive File Choose an item. 
  -Utilization of Property Choose an item. 
  -State internal compliance reviews Choose an item. 
  -Transfer of property Choose an item. 
  -Disposal of property Choose an item. 
  -Turn-in of property Choose an item. 
  5d.  DEMIL Property requirements Choose an item. 
  5e.  Training opportunities Choose an item. 
  5f.  State responsibilities in the 1033 Program Choose an item. 
  5g.  LEA responsibilities in the 1033 Program Choose an item. 
  5h.  Suspension and/or Termination Criteria Choose an item. 
  5i.  Signature requirements (ie. LEA CEO/State 
Coordinator/SPOC) 
Choose an item. 
  *5. Transfers of high visibility property are approved by the DLA 
LESO. 
Choose an item. 
 
Comments: Click here to enter text. 
   
 V.  Records Retention: 
  1.  Are the following documents on-file with the State Coordinators Office and/or LEA? 
  1a.  DLA Form 103s (aka Manual Requisitions) Choose an item. 
  1b.  DD Form 1348-1A (for all 1033 Program property 
currently on the LEA inventory) 
Choose an item. 
  1c.  DD Form 1348-1A (for all turn-ins) Choose an item. 
  1d.  DD Form 1348-1A (for all transfers) Choose an item. 
  1e.  Transfer documentation Choose an item. 
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  1f.  Turn-in documentation Choose an item. 
  1g.  Inventory adjustment documentation for authorized 
property 
Choose an item. 
  1h.  ATFE Form 10 Choose an item. 
  1i.  ATFE Form 5 Choose an item. 
  1j.  FAA Certificate of Aircraft Registration (Form 8050-1)  Choose an item. 
  1k.  Exception to policy memorandums (if applicable) Choose an item. 
  1l.  Other documentation as applicable [justification forms, 
Memorandum for Record (s), etc] 
Choose an item. 
Comments: Click here to enter text. 
   
 VI.  Property and Inventory Control: 
  1.  Is 1033 Program property properly stored in a controlled storage area 
with limited access? 
Choose an item. 
  2.  Have all reports of missing, lost, stolen, damaged or destroyed 1033 
Program property been reported to the appropriate State Coordinators 
Office? 
Choose an item. 
  3.  Have all reports of missing, lost, stolen, damaged or destroyed 1033 
Program property been reported to the appropriate Local/State/Federal 
Officials and the LESO?  Note: If the property is DEMIL Coded B, C, 
D, E, F, G or Q3 you have (24) Hours for notification. If your property 
is DEMIL Code A, or Q (with an Integrity Code of 6) you have within 
(7) days to report. 
Choose an item. 
 
 
  4.  In determining State Coordinator’s recommendation for approval of 
LEA request, is consideration given to the needs and resources of its 
LEAs (i.e. size of LEA, mission requirement and like property on 
hand)?  NOTE:  LESO personnel must conduct a random search of 
records.   
Choose an item. 
  5.  Are annual reconciliations of property receipts being conducted? Choose an item. 
  6.  Has the State submitted the previous Fiscal Year’s certified 
inventory to the LESO? 
Choose an item. 
           6a.  Date submitted: Click here to enter 
a date. 
 
  *7.  Are photographs of Front, Side and Data Plates provided to the 
LESO for Aircraft, Watercraft and Tactical Vehicles? 
Choose an item. 
  *8.  Are photographs of Weapons Data Plates provided to the LESO? Choose an item. 
Comments: No issues to report. 
   
 VII.  Transitional Distribution Point (TDP): 
  *1.  Is there an authorization document from DLA, on hand, authorizing 
your State to operate as a TDP?   
Choose an item. 
 
  2.  Are TDP property requests earmarked for a specific LEA identifying 
them as the end user?    
Choose an item. 
  3.  Is 1033 property identified and stored separate from other categories 
of property such as 1122 and State Agencies for Surplus Property 
(SASP)?              
Choose an item. 
  4.  Does the State Coordinator and/or SPOC  understand that transfers Choose an item. 
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of 1033 Program property from the TDP to LEAs within his/her State 
still need to be processed via the LESO prior to physical movement of 
property? 
Comments: Click here to enter text. 
   
 VIII.  Compliance and Utilization Reviews: 
  *1.  Is there a State-level 1033 Program Compliance Review process 
in-place, that ensures that 5% of State LEAs are inspected within the 2-
year reporting period since the last PCR?  
 
(Current MOA-2009 states that “The State shall: Conduct an OER of 
LEAs participating in the program in order to ensure accountability, 
responsibility, and program compliance.” Therefore, until new MOA is 
signed and effective, the “PASS/FAIL” criteria is based on proof that 
the State Coordinator/SPOC has an internal review process in place that 
ensures accountability, responsibility and program compliance of LEAs 
within their State.) 
 
Choose an item. 
 
  2.  Does the State Coordinator follow through with LEAs to rectify 
cases on non-compliance found on State Level PCRs? 
Choose an item. 
 
  3.  Does the State Coordinator provide documentation to the DLA 
LESO in cases of non-compliant LEAs? 
Choose an item. 
 
  4.  What steps are taken to resolve cases of non-compliance to the terms and conditions of 
the 1033 Program? 
  Click here to enter text. 
Comments: Click here to enter text. 
   
 IX.  Non-Utilized 1033 Program Property: 
  1.  Are current procedures in place for LEAs to identify and report 
serviceable property when no longer needed? 
Choose an 
item. 
  2. What steps does the State Coordinator take to ensure LEAs do not requisition 
unnecessary or excessive amounts of property? 
  Click here to enter text. 
  3.  What steps does the State Coordinator take to ensure 1033 Program property is not 
sold? 
  Click here to enter text. 
  4.  Has there been an incident, since the last conducted PCR, where an 
LEA has sold property received under the 1033 Program or received 
1033 Program property for the sole purpose of selling it?   
Choose an 
item. 
 
  4a.  If yes, provide detail and supporting documentation of the outcome (who, 
what, when, where, how much). 
N/A 
Comments: Click here to enter text. 
   
 X.  Compliance to LESO MOA: 
  1.  Is all property transferred consistent with requirements of the DLA 
MOA? 
Choose an 
item. 
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  2.  Is the State Coordinator’s Office aware that they must ensure that the 
LEA maintains adequate insurance to cover damages or injuries to 
persons or property relating to the use of the property. (Self-insurance by 
the State/LEA is acceptable) 
Choose an 
item. 
  3.  Is the State Coordinators Office aware that property available under 
the MOA is for the current use of authorized program participants; it will 
not be requested nor issued for speculative use? 
Choose an 
item. 
  4.  Is the State Coordinators Office aware that property will not be 
obtained for the purpose of sale, lease, loan rent, exchange, barter, to 
secure a loan, or to otherwise supplement normal Law Enforcement 
Agency (LEA) or State/Local governmental entity budgets? 
Choose an 
item. 
  5.  Is the State Coordinator Office aware that any transportation, repair, 
maintenance, insurance, disposal or other expenses associated with the 
excess Department of Defense (DOD) personal property is the sole 
responsibility of the State/LEA? 
Choose an 
item. 
  6.  Is the State Coordinators Office aware that all property obtained under 
the MOA must be placed into use within one (1) year of receipt and 
utilized for a minimum of one (1) year, unless the condition of the 
property renders it unusable? 
Choose an 
item. 
  7.  Is the State Coordinators Office aware approval of any variation to the 
above standard for property no longer needed by an LEA must be 
approved by the LESO through the State Coordinators Office? 
Choose an 
item. 
  8.  Is the State Coordinator’s Office aware that the DOD has authorized 
the transfer and use of excess DoD property to the State/LEA and as such 
reserves the right to recall any and all property issued at the state or LEA 
expense? 
Choose an 
item. 
  9.  Is the State Coordinators Office aware that excess DEMIL A & Q 
(with Integrity Code of 6) property will transfer title to the State/LEA 
after receipt, placement into use and utilization for a minimum of one (1) 
year? 
Choose an 
item. 
  10.  Is the State Coordinators Office aware that to the extent permitted by 
law, the State Coordinator/LEA shall indemnify and hold the U.S. 
Government harmless from any and all actions, claims, debts, demands, 
judgments, liabilities, cost, and attorney's fees arising out of, claimed on 
account of, or in any manner predicated upon loss of or damage to 
property and injuries, illness or disabilities to or death of any and all 
persons whatsoever, including members of the general public, or to the 
property of any legal or political entity including states, local and 
interstate bodies, in any manner caused by or contributed to by the 
State/LEA, its agents, servants, employees, or any person subject to its 
control while in, upon or about the sale site and/or the site on which the 
property is located, or while the property is in the possession of, used by 
or subject to the control of the State/LEA, its agents, servants, or 
employees after the property has been removed from U.S. Government 
control.  The U.S. Government assumes no liability for damages or 
injuries to any person(s) or property arising from the use of the property. 
Choose an 
item. 
Comments: Click here to enter text. 
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 XI.  Conclusion: 
  
  
 XII.  Areas of concern: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
  
      
 
  
 XIII.  Areas of Recommendation: 
     
 
 Click here to enter text. 
  
 XIV.  Areas of Praise: 
  
 
 XV.  PCR Inventory Results: 
 
STATE OF TENNESSEE 1033 PROGRAM PROPERTY 
  
STATE TOTALS *REQUIRED SAMPLE SIZE TOTAL REVIEWED DURING PCR 
TOTAL      
ON-HAND % ACCURACY 
WEAPONS   
*ITEMS PHYSICALLY 
INVENTORIED 
*ITEMS REVIEWED VIA 
APPROVED CUSTODY CARD   
  
AIRCRAFT   
*ITEMS PHYSICALLY 
INVENTORIED 
*ITEMS REVIEWED VIA 
APPROVED CUSTODY CARD   
  
WATERCRAFT   
*ITEMS PHYSICALLY 
INVENTORIED 
*ITEMS REVIEWED VIA 
APPROVED CUSTODY CARD   
  
TACTICAL 
VEHICLES   
*ITEMS PHYSICALLY 
INVENTORIED 
*ITEMS REVIEWED VIA 
APPROVED CUSTODY CARD   
  
GENERAL 
PROPERTY   
*ITEMS PHYSICALLY 
INVENTORIED 
*ITEMS REVIEWED VIA 
APPROVED CUSTODY CARD   
  
TOTALS       
**OVERALL STATE INVENTORY ACCURACY RATE (%):  
       The DLA LESO PCR Team is required to physically inventory or obtain a copy of an acceptable 
custody card for 100% of the 1033 Program Weapons, Aircraft, Watercraft and Tactical Vehicles, as 
appearing on the accountable record, for each LEA that has been selected for review during the PCR. The 
LEA must provide the DLA LESO PCR Team a copy of any custody card (s) used, at the time of the site 
visit, and must maintain the custody card (s) on-file as part of substantiating records. An acceptable version 
of a custody card must contain the following elements: 1) LEA name, 2) Name of individual responsible 
for physical custody of item, 3) Item nomenclature (Name), 4) Serial number of item (if applicable), 5) 
QTY of item (if more than one), 6) Printed name of individual responsible for physical custody of item 7) 
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Signature of individual responsible for physical custody of the item and 8) Date. 
 
**Overall State Inventory Accuracy Rate (%) is determined by adding required Weapons (A), Aircraft (B), 
Watercraft (C), Tactical Vehicles (D) and General Property (E) at LEAs selected for review during the 
PCR, and dividing by the actual # of the property that was physically inventoried (X) or verified via an 
approved custody card (Y) during the course of the PCR 
 
          
(X or Y) = Overall State Inventory Accuracy Rate (%) 
 
 
 XVI.  PCR Training provided to the State:  
PCR Training Date:   
# of Agencies Trained # of Officers Trained # of State Coordinator/SPOC trained 
# of DLA Disposition Services 
Field Representatives Trained 
Click here to enter text. Click here to enter text. Click here to enter text. Click here to enter text. 
     
      Thank you for the hospitality and professionalism shown to us during our visit.  As always, we at the 
LESO stand ready to support and serve.  If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact 
us at 1-800-532-9946 or via email at DRMSLESO@dla.mil. 
  
 XVII.  Program Compliance Review Team: 
   
 
X________________________________ 
 Deborah Smith 
 
X________________________________ 
 Dan Arnold 
 
Dates of Program Compliance Review: Click here 
to enter a 
date. 
to Click here to enter a date. 
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